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JPRS-WER-87-034

22 APRIL 1987

# West Europe Report

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Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

22 APRIL 1987

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## DECLINING GLISTRUP PARTY MAY HOLD BALANCE OF POWER

## Possible Post-Election Scenario

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Feb 87 p 4

[Article by Torkild Dahl: "Glistrup's Party on the Way Back to Being Weighing Master"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Copenhagen. The Danish election year began with a dead heat between Prime Minister Poul Schluter's nonsocialist government and the opposition, led by Social Democrat Party [SD] chairman Anker Jorgensen--but the Progressive Party [FKP] is on the way to a surprising comeback as the balance on the political scales.

The biggest and hottest political question in Denmark is the time of the election, but Prime Minister Poul Schluter still has not shown his cards, which obviously makes the speculation even more high flying.

By January of next year at the latest there will be an election in Denmark. Both the prime minister and the leader of the government support party, the Radical Liberal Party [RV], Niels Helveg Petersen, have said that they want a full four-year election period, and therefore a Folketing election as late as possible. What is decisive in the matter is that Poul Schluter is the first prime minister in many years who can choose the time himself, because there are no insoluble political problems on his table. The Folketing election will therefore take place when politician Poul Schluter considers that the prospects of reelection are the greatest.

Opinion polls therefore give political observers the best insight into the prime ministers thoughts, and therefore the opinion poll in Sunday's BERLINGSKE TIDENDE was certainly the most read article so far this year.

## FKP Decides

The government bloc with its support party is even with the opposition, consisting of SD and the Socialist People's Party [SF]. Each bloc has 85 seats, not counting the seats belonging to Greenland and the Faroe Islands. FKP, which expects to gain five seats, can therefore decide the political majority. FKP belongs to the farthest right wing in Danish politics, but has

previously--in a vote on the budget--shown that the party is capable in the political game of crossing the middle line in decisive voting.

Only a red majority could cause Prime Minister Schluter to back up, and opinion polls do not indicate anything like that. The prime minister's pleasure with the results of the poll can not, however, be characterized as dominant, because a situation in which FKP is in the weighing master role has been characterized by political observers as Schluter's nightmare.

FKP is still pushing its campaign against taxes and against an open refugee policy, which is expected to ensure the party's survival. Mogens Glistrup is reduced to being a symbol of a past era and he will hardly be an MP again, even if he should get elected. It is thought in high government circles that perhaps Mogens Glistrup can be accepted if popularly elected, since a former SD mayor in Aalborg who was sentenced to prison was reelected at a local level, but a majority of the Folketing would hardly accept Glistrup. Even though a sentenced local politician can be reelected after serving his punishment, it says in the constitution that people who are punished for actions which make them generally unworthy to sit in the Folketing are not electable. The constitution does not mention the other situation wherein the punishment has been served, only about a person's judgment.

The other side of the problem concerning FKP's weighing master role is that the cooperative partner RV would not get involved in a policy which should have FKP's stamp.

#### Spring Election Unlikely

Prime Minister Schluter therefore has no prospects of a good election if he should get the idea to announce one during the early spring months when the government otherwise is coming successfully through the wage negotiations with voluntary agreements between employers and employees as the result.

SD has prepared a strategy for a spring election, but the legislative burden is so great in the Folketing just now that the prime minister can hardly announce an election until after the end of this session in the beginning of June at the earliest.

A Folketing election in September or October is therefore more likely. An election at the end of the year has been mentioned, but by waiting so long Prime Minister Poul Schluter would lock himself into the election date, and wind up with economic problems, which he certainly does not want during an election campaign.

#### Schluter Vulnerable on Taxes

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Feb 87 p 4

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Taxes a Sensitive Point for the Government"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Copenhagen. These days the Danes are sweating over taxes. The



declaration forms must be filled in, and in the middle of all the commotion involving forms and strong coffee a not surprising bit of news comes through-- tax pressure in Denmark is the highest in the world.

This year nearly every other kronor will be paid in taxes, either directly with the tax bills, or through value added tax and other additions.

Welfare, the continued high standard of social and health care shall be paid, as well as the cost of many years overconsumption, namely the interest on the 55 billion kroner foreign debt.

New agreements with wage increases of five to six percent have however helped to raise the Danes' spirits a bit, but the promise by the gifted but politically inexperienced minister of industry, Niels Wilhjelm, about tax reductions was quickly cancelled.

Minister of Economy Anders Andersen replied immediately that tax reductions would first take place when the deficit in the balance of payments is defrayed and people have learned to save a little more.

That is straight talk for the Danes. Forget about tax reductions now and work harder on your tax declarations.

Conservative Niels Wilhjelm made a political mistake by suggesting that a tax reduction was in the offing, but his views are the expression of strong skepticism on the part of Conservative politicians. They are afraid for the credibility of the government with the voters if taxes just continue to rise. Taxes did that also under Social Democrat governments, but not as much as now.

It has been a long time since the esteemed Conservative politician Poul Moller, during the time when he was minister of finance, uttered the famous words that the best place for money is in the pockets of the citizens.

#### Rapid Increase

When Prime Minister Poul Schluter took over the government after Social Democrat Anker Jorgensen, the tax pressure in Denmark was barely 45 percent. During Prime Minister Schluter's four years of government the tax pressure has risen to 51 percent.

Minister of Economy Anders Andersen says tax reductions are in view from the beginning of the 1990's, but the Social Democrat Mogens Lykketoft, former tax minister, says that talk about tax reductions is hypocrisy during an election year.

And there will be an election in Denmark, and taxes, surtaxes, and the many interferences to stop the consuming Danes' lavish spending will again become the most important issue. And even though the Danes live well the chief economist of the SDS Savings Bank, Nils Groes, says that for the average Dane 1987 is the same as 1972. Yes, in fact in 1976 the Danes had a real wage which was 20 percent higher than now.

## Large Black Market

Those are the official figures, but the Danes have become inventive with the years, and the black market thrives with friendly help from auto repairs to large construction jobs. And the newest discovery is cheap trips to fantastic low-priced shops south of the Danish-West German border. Several hundred buses a week depart from Copenhagen, Fyn, yes even from North Jylland to Flensburg so that Danes will be able to make the cheap purchases.

It is not just beer and red wine which are cheap. Stereo installations, TV sets, video machines, etc. are sold for almost half price because of low West German taxes. And if the Dane needs a refrigerator or dishwasher he just takes his car. Gasoline is so cheap in West Germany that the automobile trip is paid for by the amount saved by filling up south of the Danish border.

## Profitable Trip Abroad

Some say that it is the Danes' protest against higher tax pressure, but regardless of how the psychologists and the economists translate it, the new popular movement to the neighboring country means an immediate large economic benefit for the individual Dane.

But the politicians' opinion is absolutely that the Danes should not consume so much. Saving should come first, and that is not just Minister of Economy Anders Anderson's good advice to the people. All politicians agree.

And the politicians have actually made a great contribution to changing the buying habits of the Danish consumers. As the Danes are sweating these days over their tax declarations, it is small consolation for them to realize that next year it will be different and certainly worse.

## Savings Foremost

At the first of the year a new tax reform took effect in Denmark. The government parties together with the Social Democrats and the middle party Radical Liberals have worked out a number of tax regulations which put savings foremost.

The most important change for the Danes is that it will be more expensive to borrow money. Now one can only deduct about 50 percent of the cost of interest, compared with up to 73 percent previously. Interest income from savings is now taxed less, so there is profit in saving up for the TV and automobile.

## Cleaned Up Jungle of Deductions

In the tax reform there has also been a cleanup among the thousands of deduction possibilities which the Danes have been very inventive in finding.

Beyond the changes in the calculation of interest income, the main aim of the reforms is to bring down the high tax rates. They have been lowered from 73 to 68 percent, and the reduction of the tax percentages continues all the

way down through the table so that the tax reduction is greatest for the lowest incomes. The principle of the broadest shoulders bearing the heaviest burden is maintained.

But the bill for reducing the tax percentages will have to be paid, and paid preferably by those who have large debts, but also by a higher corporate tax for firms. And that part of the tax will of course affect taxpayers who will pay higher prices.

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## COMMON COURSE PARTY CONGRESS CLAIMS DEMOCRATIC BASIS

## Would Quit NATO

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 17 Feb 87 p 5

[Text] Copenhagen--The Social Democrats are idiots and the members of the Socialist People's Party [SF] are copycats, according to a boastful party chairman, Preben Moller Hansen, when Common Course submitted the signatures yesterday that are intended to secure the party the right to nominate candidates in the next Folketing election.

It is somewhat unclear how many signatures Common Course turned in. The party itself said it had a good 20,000 names. Assistant Secretary Wilhelm Brockmeyer of the Internal Affairs Ministry said there were around 19,500 signatures.

On the face of it Common Course does not have much chance of being declared eligible to run for Folketing in the first round. That requires 19,212 valid signatures. Traditionally some signatures are rejected because the signers have already put their names on a petition for another party. At this time the Danish Communist Party, the Marxist-Leninist Party, the Single-Tax Party, the Green Party, the Humanist Party and the International Socialist Workers Party have been approved as eligible to nominate candidates in the election. It would not take many overlapping signatures to put Common Course back out in the cold.

Common Course wants a 10 percent increase in health sector budgets, more money for education, the right to an education for everyone, bigger pensions and political abolition of unemployment. Denmark should get out of NATO and EC. Money will be provided by taxing the foreign subsidiaries of Danish businesses. That will provide 16 billion kroner. The military will be totally abolished. That will provide 17 billion kroner. All yields on bonds in 1988 would be collected by the treasury and placed in a compulsory savings fund. That will provide 80-90 billion kroner. In addition there is the possibility of a "rapid currency reform." There will be no need for unemployment benefits and supplemental assistance and that will provide more money.

"It would be a damned good thing for ordinary people," said Preben Moller Hansen.

#### Alliance of Left Proposed

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 22 Feb 87 p 12

[Article by Ulla Lund: "Seaman Wants to Command"]

[Text] "If a real-estate swindler and a former garbage man can become prime minister, why not an honest seaman?" asked Preben Moller Hansen, national chairman of the new labor party, Common Course, who is planning for a new government cooperation.

The honest seaman--Preben Moller Hansen, in case there are any doubts--predicted with familiar self-assurance that Common Course, SF and the Social Democrats will have a majority after the coming Folketing election.

Therefore in connection with the opening of the first national congress of Common Course, the chairman issued an invitation yesterday to SF to find a kind of common political front in relation to the Social Democrats.

"It would be unwise of SF to decline, they have so often wooed the Social Democrats themselves. We must decide on a policy that can bridge over the divided left wing, thus providing a real alternative to the black cabinet that has cracked the whip long enough over the weaker members of Danish society," said Preben Moller Hansen.

The party, which has not yet received final approval from the internal affairs minister, puts a heavy emphasis on social reform--for the benefit of the 1 million poor Danes in this country.

"Our unemployed people, welfare clients, retirees of all kinds, early retirees, those who are sick. They are the real poor and the important thing for us is to create social security for them," said Preben Moller Hansen.

#### Plank Extended

Like a captain trying to call out the crew through the noise of the blast, the voice of the seamen's boss rang through the almost full "ship" in Gerbrands School in Copenhagen. He verbally kicked not only the nonsocialist wing but also SF and the Social Democrats out on the plank:

"The Social Democrats had already introduced the social cuts that have simply been reinforced by the nonsocialist wing. Neither the Social Democrats nor SF really want to restore the social balance or redistribute social benefits. SF has betrayed its former political standpoints."

### Leftist Party Rejects Ties

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 22 Feb 87 p 12

[Text] SF does not feel tempted to accept the offer from Common Course to present a joint political plan to the Social Democrats before the coming election.

However Gert Petersen would like to talk to Common Course "just as I would any other party" and he is waiting with great interest to see the party's political program.

Gert Petersen also dismissed the idea of Preben Moller Hansen as prime minister in a three-party government coalition.

"When he can suggest that it is obvious that Preben Moller Hansen is making fun--not of the bourgeoisie but of the working class.

"And we do not want a joint program, either with Common Course or with any other party."

### Democratic Policies Stressed

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 23 Feb 87 p 5

[Text] Some 400 delegates to the first congress of the Common Course Labor Party elected Seamen's Union chairman Preben Moller Hansen as head of the party yesterday.

In addition to Moller Hansen, the daily leadership of the party will be in the hands of Jorgen Tved, vice chairman, Gert Rasmussen, Erik Markvad Jorgensen, Henrik Berlau, Mogens Andersen and Hans Dresler.

The congressional delegates rejected a proposal that the party should be declared a revolutionary communist party.

"We are a democratic labor party without exclusive rules and everyone who wants social assets in Denmark to be distributed differently has a right to participate," the party chairman said after the meeting.

### Party Leader Assessed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by George Hilton: "Election Expert Sees Preben Moller Caught in Trap"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Preben Moller Hansen is combining popular left-wing slogans with economic models that will not stand up, says an election expert. "The chairman's style does not really suit the Danish people."

The Seamen's Union party, Common Course, wants to steer around Folketing. Preben Moller Hansen's program lacks political reality, his style is arrogant and he will not be able to create a Glistrup groundswell on the left.

That was the opinion of Associate Professor Johannes Andersen of Aalborg University Center, an expert on voter behavior, with regard to the newly-formed Common Course Party and its leader, who keelhailed Social Democratic leader Anker Jorgensen on TV Wednesday evening and made the left-wing parties walk the plank.

"Preben Moller Hansen is trying, just as Glistrup did in his day, to use some economic models to prove that his program is feasible. He will have to use a lot of energy to defend these models and that will make them untrustworthy. Preben Moller Hansen's economic house of cards will collapse when it is subjected to closer analysis."

Johannes Andersen does not think that Preben Moller Hansen will be the left-wing answer of the 1980's to Mogens Glistrup's protest movement of the 1970's:

"Glistrup's slogans caught fire in 1973 because there was a need in the nonsocialist segment of the population for a revolt against the ruling nonsocialist government. There is no corresponding need today for a left-wing revolt. The left wing is too preoccupied with whether there is any sense left in leftist standpoints and whether the Social Democrats and SF can offer a government alternative."

At the same time the election expert said that Preben Moller Hansen is unlikely to attract many voters on the basis of his outspoken style:

"It is quite new in Danish politics, but it is unsuited to our mentality. Preben Moller Hansen is much too self-centered and there is too much bungling. It is unlikely that he will get more than 30,000 votes. Common Course could take so many votes away from the Left-Socialists [VS] that they will not get into Folketing either and it will also get votes from the Danish CP," Johannes Andersen said.

The Common Course Party is making a strong appeal to the nation's pension recipients with the promise of free housing, 5,000 kroner in tax-free monthly pensions, etc.

"This has been tried before without success. Pension recipients are among the most loyal voters in existence. Most of them are Social Democrats and they will probably continue to vote for the Social Democratic Party," Johannes Andersen remarked.

The chairman of the Seamen's Union should not count on support from the chairman of the Pension Recipients' Association, former Federation of Trade Unions [LO] chairman Thomas Nielsen. He delivered the following broadside against Preben Moller Hansen:

"His program is pure Utopia. There is no sense in it at all. You could call his election promises a long-winded emotional outburst. Preben Moller Hansen just wants to stand on the Folketing rostrum and make a fuss."

The leader of the Center-Democrats, Erhard Jakobsen, said that the Common Course Labor Party, the newly-formed party of seamen's boss Preben Moller Hansen, will be important in two ways:

"The left wing will be split even more. The Communists will have no chance at all of getting back into Folketing, for Preben Moller Hansen will take their votes," Erhard Jakobsen said.

#### Former Communists in Party

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by Lis Lipschitz; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] It is primarily former members of the Danish Communist Party who now hold key positions in the Common Course Party.

Seven people are in charge of the day-to-day leadership of Common Course. Only one has never been a member of the Danish Communist Party. Other central people in Common Course also started their political careers in the Danish CP.

The day-to-day leaders are:

Party chairman Preben Moller Hansen, chairman of the Danish Seamen's Union, former member of the Danish CP executive committee.

Vice chairman Jorgen Tved, former member of the Metropolitan Council and the Copenhagen City Council, representing the Danish CP.

Secretary Henrik Berlau, secretary to the Seamen's Union chairman, former Danish CP member.

Union secretary Erik Markvad Jorgensen. The only member of the regular leadership who has not been a member of the Danish CP.

Treasurer Mogens Andersen, former Danish CP member.

Secretary Hans Dresler, Seamen's Union unemployment fund, former Danish CP member.

Secretary Gert Rasmussen, executive committee member of the National Association of Danish Club Members, former member of the Danish CP and active in the Vietnam movement.



Other people in key positions are:

Copenhagen chairman Gert Christensen, former Danish CP member.

Kristian Engelsen, member of the Helsingor city council for the Sund group, former Danish CP member.

Frederiksberg section leader Torben Sorensen, former member of the Koge city council for the Danish CP.

Auditor Villy Thomasen, chief cashier for the Seamen's Union, former Danish CP member.

#### Paper Compares With Glistrup

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 27 Feb 87 p 12

[Editorial: "Glistrup in Reverse"]

[Text] The chairman of the Seamen's Union, former Danish CP central committee member Preben Moller Hansen, makes no secret of his intentions with regard to his party, Common Course: "I would love to mount the Folketing rostrum," he wrote in B.T. recently, adding with his well-known imagery: "I would love to see the Folketing speaker's face when I start lecturing them and telling them what is wrong in good old Denmark and how we can solve the problems."

At first glance Preben Moller Hansen looks like an intermission comedian. So did the predecessor with whom he can be most closely compared as a demagogic rebel, Glistrup. But that did not prevent the Progressives from winning as many as 28 seats in Folketing, rendering it unmanageable for the next 10 years. Thus everyone--wise after the event--should closely analyze this new phenomenon with which Danish politics has been saddled. The truth is that only the henchmen of the seamen's boss wish him luck, but he knows that a stroke of fate can create a lot of trouble.

The various opinion polls indicate that if a small party like the Progressives, the Greens or Common Course rises above the cutoff limit it can have a decisive influence on the next government constellation, which will inevitably lead to instability. Similar warnings had no effect when Glistrup did what Preben Moller Hansen would now like to do. Then thousands of voters--from the extreme left, including Communists, to the extreme right--allowed themselves to be rhetorically raped by a rebel who wanted to make fundamental changes in our social system. But the consequences of Glistrup's election victory--the devastating instability from 1973 to 1984--should be over by now. And in addition no nonsocialist voter and no Social Democrat should forget that Preben Moller Hansen has roots in the Danish Communist Party--and he would be Danish CP chairman Jorgen Jensen's natural successor today if he had not fallen out with the top leaders of the Danish CP some years ago because they were not communist enough and because he could not become head of the party quickly enough.

Now Preben Moller Hansen has finally become a party leader. Like Mogens Glistrup, who first tried to become a member of Folketing disguised as a Conservative and later showed his true colors. Here we have a "Glistrup in reverse," the ex-Communist Preben Moller Hansen, who is now masquerading in his self-created role as the unifying midpoint of the left wing. As an intermission comedian he should not be despised. The same applies to the split in the left wing. But we must issue a warning against the consequences for the now stable political development if Preben Moller Hansen gets the power he wants.

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CSO: 3613/55

## NEW AP LEADER REFLECTS CHANGES IN RIGHT WING

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Feb 87 pp 16-24

[Article by Juan Altable]

[Excerpts] There is a characteristic which differentiates Hernandez Mancha from his predecessors as a leader of the right wing in this country, whether they be named Adolfo Suarez or Manuel Fraga. Mancha held no post in the Franco regime, nor has he been rejected by his mentor, Don Manuel, nor by any of his links with the old guard of the right wing. In short, no one can embarrass him by bringing to light his political past. He is innocent of associations with Franco, although in itself this creates an great problem in his full assumption of the duties of his position as leader of the right wing. He has no record as a deputy, and is a kind of opposition leader in exile.

It goes without saying that this leader, now 35, held no political position under Francisco Franco's orders, and that he had no need to have recourse to any shameful pact, such as, for example, that signed by his political mentor, Manuel Fraga, so that the socialists would not constantly bring up his role in the past in the parliament.

But there is more. The vast majority of his new executive officers, ranging from Gabino Puche, a lawyer of 37, to Mariano Rajoy, a registrar of deeds who is 31, or Arturo Garcia Tizon, a lawyer of 41, can mount any speakers' podium with no association of these faces with blue shirts and right arms raised high.

It is these new right-wing politicians who have blocked some persistent relics of the past, such as the former general director of the RTVE, Carlos Robles Piquer, and the former mayor of Madrid by specific designation, Juan de Arespacochaga, from the leadership level in the AP. It is a fact that his position of power is not the result of any coldly conceived political plan, as was the case with the famous Suresnes socialist. It is simply the product of an impressive amount of stubbornness and good luck.

Thus it is understandable that the businessmen on the top level eye them fearfully, and that a banker like Pablo Garnica could have said: "We do not want to have the same unpleasant surprises with Hernandez Mancha that we had with Adolfo Suarez."

But in reality, was this Eighth Popular Alliance Congress a kind of right-wing Suresnes? In the end, will the people of Spain, and not only those who vote for the AP, be able to rely on a civilized, European right wing which has cast off its reactionary garb once and for all? It is still too soon to be able to say.

Antonio Hernandez Mancha insisted, in speaking to this periodical, that his goal is "to create a modern, civilized right wing comparable to that in Europe." But the obstacles he will have to remove to achieve this are tremendous, beginning with the residue of the old right wing itself, including such individuals as Jose Manuel Romay and Luis Guillermo Perinat, who remain embedded in the new leadership. Not to mention such special figures as Abel Matutes and Angel Sanchis.

And further, the imminence of the municipal and autonomous region elections will force Hernandez Mancha to leave the entire provincial apparatus of the AP intact, and it includes some cadres with an abundance of the hackneyed image of short gentlemen with thin mustaches and ill-humored expressions. And, finally, it is not even certain that any of the "young lions" serving in his new executive structure are as "tough" as their venerable progenitors, those who were given early retirement without prior notice.

His very rise to the presidency of the AP has caused a disturbance all across the spectrum of the center-right. Jose Antonio Segurado's liberals are content, because they believe that this will facilitate future agreements. A part of the PDP, represented by its vice presidents, Rodolfo Martin Villa and Javier Ruperez, has come out in favor of a closer rapprochement, while its president, Oscar Alzaga, continues to dream of a future alliance with the duke of Suarez. And the view in the Convergencia i Unio is that, although it is too soon to make a judgment as to whether the traditional right-wing label has disappeared, the image of the new leaders suggests that the new AP will be something different. Where the constellation of regional right-wing parties with which autonomous Spain teems is concerned, the relationships are varied.

Miguel Ramon Izquierdo, leader of the Valencian Union, believes that winning at a congress is one thing and the executive leadership of a party is another, and that "At most, there will be slight variations in the AP methods of operation." In the view of Hipolito Gomez de las Rocas, president of the Aragon Regional Party, "If Hernandez Mancha wants to build a modern right wing, he will have to center himself more in political space and be generous with the regional parties." This is something like what Jeronimo Alberti, president of the Majorca Union, said to this review: "The right wing of the present should abandon the evil aspects of the past and cease to be the standard-bearer of Spanish unity in a state made up of autonomous bodies."

The entire Spanish center-right, then, is awaiting the first steps to be taken by this young government attorney who invokes the "rockers" and claims for himself the proud status of one who is "rightist, free of any complex."

But this Andalusian will have to do something more than making minor changes in his image, such as changing his spectacle frames, cutting a rebel hairstyle short or changing shirts, if he wants to become a conservative leader in the

European style. He has chosen to be a populist leader, but he must not forget that there has been no one as popular in Great Britain in recent years as Margaret Thatcher, a woman who lacks a sense of humor and who dyes her hair because she fears growing old, but who communicates a feeling of strength and security capable of dazzling the British electorate. What Helmut Kohl is not is the quintessence of brilliance, but he does control his party with a firm hand, and he is capable of providing solutions to the problems of his country.

And, basically, if Antonio Hernandez Mancha really wants to carry the operation through to the end, he will have to bring about a second revolution, even more difficult than the generation change. He will have to effect a profound renewal of the program proposal of his party.

Is he ready for this? For the time being, establishing what program differences exist between this hypothetical neo-right wing and the lifetime right wing is as difficult a thing as trying to hold an eel in one's hands.

In economic matters, the young lions vacillate between the most stubborn neoliberalism and admission of the corrective role of the state in a free-market economy. They claim to be "Europeanists" from head to foot and allies of the Western countries, but they claim that this does not mean that they must say "amen" to all of the actions of the United States. And, naturally, they see themselves as the defenders of individual freedoms in a state of law. Things become more difficult when they get down to specific matters. In the negotiations on the American bases, they simply do not know what to say. And on a key issue, abortion, they are clearly against it but do not know how to say this without seeming hopelessly reactionary and blurring their image.

Many people wonder if some day, this confused "mare magnum" might resemble the programs which have led the right-wing parties in Europe, from Denmark to Portugal and including France, Germany, Austria, Great Britain and the United States, to triumph.

There is one important fact. The right wing is winning out in Europe, but not the right wing pure and simple. It is instead, so to speak, the "light" version, easier to inhale or consume, and in the final analysis, more modern and civilized. In other words, it was the Chirac who had been won over to liberalism, not the neo-Gaullist of some years ago, who triumphed. Kohl won, but Strauss lost. And Mrs Thatcher may consolidate her position, but it is because she represents the meritocracy of middle and upper-class origin for whom competition and efficiency are a religion, rather than the old lordly and obsolete conservatives.

And another thing. The phantom which travels about Europe establishing right-wing governments represents above all a reaction to the welfare state which the left wing promoted in the 1960s and which went bankrupt when the economic crisis came. Therefore the basis of the discourse of all of the European conservative leaders is essentially the same--capitalism is not the problem, but the solution.

The difficulties facing the leaders of a neo-right wing in Spain in selling this message in a country like Spain are obvious. To begin with, the welfare

state continues to be the goal toward which Felipe Gonzalez' socialists are cautiously proceeding. And on the other hand, capitalism does not sell too well in backward countries which have a pyramid of young people and great social inequalities, as Spain does.

The polls show this. According to a CIS report at the end of last year, only 3 percent of the people in Spain regard themselves explicitly as pure right-wingers. Furthermore, only another 8 percent associated themselves with the "moderate or center-right wing" concept.

At the other end of the scale, the situation is very different. While only 7 percent of the people of Spain described themselves as leftists, another 30 percent--and here lies the great difference--describe themselves as "moderate or center-leftist."

For those who have placed their hopes in Antonio Hernandez Mancha's new AP, the great challenge is to expand the Popular Alliance beyond that narrow 11 percent margin in the survey, so that it can sink its teeth in the decisive center, or in other words, exceed Fraga's traditional ceiling. At the present time, the 24 percent of the citizens who regard themselves as in the center continue to vote, for the most part, socialist.

A difficulty exists when one is not the heir of a conservative leader such as Churchill or De Gaulle, who won a patriotic war against the Nazi invaders. The AP, for its part, is the direct heir of Franco, who also won his war, but it was a war against democracy.

Therefore it remains to be seen if the Spanish neo-right wing is capable of reconciling the defense of the interests of the large economic groups with a program which can inspire the majority in society. One of the questions most often asked in political circles is whether Antonio Hernandez Mancha will have sufficient personal determination and political standing to become the great renovator of the Spanish right wing.

Those in his party are convinced that he will.

It remains to be seen what the rest of the electorate will think. His first television appearance, of course, was not a very happy one.

## Those on the Way Up



Abel Matutes Juan

He controls a half of Ibiza. Felipe Gonzalez called upon him to be the Spanish rights commissioner in the EEC, and Fraga made use of him to develop his entire economic liberal ideology. Now it seems that without having to leave Brussels, he will be one of the strong men of Mancha's team. And there are those who suspect that he may be preparing for the post-Mancha era as well. He is a banker and businessman and is 45 years old.



Arturo Garcia Tizon

He is regarded as an excellent public speaker and a very tough negotiator. He has concerned himself in particular with the interterritorial relations of the party. He served as the link between Antonio Hernandez Mancha and the AP apparatus. He has also been concerned with a community of great traditional importance to the AP, Galicia. He is the new secretary general. A government attorney, he is 41.



Alberto Ruizgallardon

He participated, as secretary general, in the most tormented period in the history of the Popular Alliance. He went into politics and into the party

which his father, one of Manuel Fraga's most loyal collaborators, helped to found. On the death of his father, he planned to abandon his position to devote himself to the family law firm. He is one of the vice presidents among the new officers. A public prosecutor, he is 27 years old.



Gabino Puche Rodriguez-Acosta

His political career is in practice linked with the AP in Andalusia, where he has held various posts, concerning himself in particular with the party in Jaen, where he lives. He is a member of Antonio Hernandez Mancha's circle of friends and professional colleagues, and is one of his trusted assistants. He is a government attorney and is 37 years old.



Mariano Rajoy Brey

He has held various public positions in Pontevedra and in the autonomous institutions of Galicia. Although his political career developed in the shadow of Jose Luis Barreiro, he later clashed with him, taking over from him as vice president of the Xunta, which post he currently holds. He is the strong man of the AP in Galicia. He is a registrar of deeds and is 31.




## Those on The Way Out




Alfonso Osorio

Fraga appointed him as vice president and strategist, although others saw it as merely giving him license to scheme. He was a sponsor of the Popular Coalition, the first to oppose Miguel Herrero and the first to advocate the Hernandez Mancha solution. A representative in the Cortes under Franco, a former counselor of the realm, he also served as vice president of the government with Suarez. He is affiliated with the banking sector. A government attorney, he is 73 years old.



Juan de Arespachaga

Fraga made him mayor of Madrid when Carlos Arias Navarro headed the government. One of the leading representatives of the old guard of the party, he headed its political council. He was the spokesman for the Popular Coalition in the Senate, where he served in the first legislature by royal appointment. A highway engineer, he is 67.



Fernando Suarez

He was vice president during Franco's last government and vice president in Fraga's last executive team. Prior to holding that post, he challenged the

apparatus, demanding internal democracy (he was the author of the open lists at the last AP congress), as well as Abel Matutes, because of the liberalism of the party's economic policy. At 54 years of age, he is a professor.



Miguel Herrero y Rodriguez de Minon


Adolfo Suarez saw him as an agent of explosive action, while for Fraga he was a great recruit who would give him a centrist cachet. In him, his sponsor obtained a constitutional father, and he made profitable use of his parliamentary gifts. Herrero took advantage of his close association with the leader to establish his own apparatus in the party and to pursue his ideology and strategy. He was vice president and leader of the parliamentary group. Now 47, he is a Council of State attorney.



Carlos Robles Piquer

No one was more loyal to Fraga than his closest brother-in-law. It was he who appointed him minister of education during the first government under the monarchy, and who also made him an AP factotum, as coordinator general. Another of his protectors, Calvo-Sotelo, appointed him director general of the RTVE in order to put an end to the liberalism of Castedo, and he succeeded. He is 62 years old and a diplomat.

Development of the Center-Right in Spain  
(in percentages of votes)



General Elections

1977	1979	1982	1986
UCD ..... 34.62	UCD ..... 35.02	UCD ..... 7.14	CP * ..... 26.00
AP ..... 8.33	CD ..... 5.96	CP ..... 26.18	PNV ..... 1.53
PNV ..... 1.72	PNV ..... 1.65	PNV ..... 1.89	CIU ..... 5.02
	CIU ..... 2.69	CIU ..... 3.69	CDS ..... 9.23
		CDS ..... 2.89	PRD ..... 0.96
Total ..... 44.67	45.32	41.79	42.74

\* The Popular Alliance only competed on its own in 1977. In 1979, it participated within the Democratic Coalition, and in 1982 and 1986, within the Popular Coalition.

X-ray Picture of the Spanish Center-Right in Figures

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC  
PARTY (PDP)



Membership--50,968  
National deputies--21  
Senators--11  
Autonomous deputies--60  
Mayors and council members--4,108  
Leader--Oscar Alzaga

POPULAR ALLIANCE (AP)



Membership--210,000  
National deputies--68  
Senators--59  
Three autonomous presidents  
Autonomous parliamentarians--248  
Mayors--2,006  
Council members--16,595  
Leader-- Antonio Hernandez Mancha

LIBERAL PARTY (PL)



Membership--6,000  
National deputies--12  
Senators--8  
Autonomous deputies--19  
Mayors--16  
Council members--66  
Leader--Jose Antonio Segurado

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC  
CENTER PARTY (CDS)



Membership--26,000  
National deputies--19  
Senators--3  
Autonomous deputies--11  
Mayors--207  
Council members--1,339  
Leader--Adolfo Suarez

EUSKO ALKARTASUNA (EA)



Membership--unknown  
National deputies--2  
Senators--2  
Autonomous deputies--13  
Leader--Carlos Garaicoetxea

BASQUE NATIONALIST  
PARTY (PNV)



Membership--18,000  
National deputies--4  
Senators--5  
Autonomous deputies--20  
Mayors--173  
Council members--1,322  
Leader--Xabier Arzallus

CONVERGENCIA I UNIO  
(CiU)



Membership--30,000  
National deputies--18  
Senators--8  
Autonomous deputies--72  
Mayors--432  
Council members--3,279  
Leader--Jordi Pujol

5157

CSO:3548/54

## INDEPENDENCE FEELINGS RUNNING HIGH IN CATALAN MOVEMENTS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 2 Mar 87 p 8

[Article by Juan Garcia; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The three separatist organizations in Catalonia, Esquerra Republicana [Republican Left], Crida a la Solidaritat and Movement de Defensa de la Terra (MDT), are in the midst of internal upheavals. They come at a time when the man in the street seems to long for independence. Two developments confirm this: a poll according to which almost half of Catalan youth are separatists, and the mass rally (25,000 people) that Crida and Movement managed to stage recently.

Barcelona--Almost half, 46 percent, of people under the age of 20 accept the possibility of independence for Catalonia. This statistic has been confirmed, with minor up or down variations depending on who commissions the poll, by the various opinion surveys that have been made public.

The streets of Barcelona have increasingly witnessed an outpouring of separatist sentiment.

The two most radical organizations that represent this philosophy, the Crida a la Solidaritat and the Movement de Defensa de Terra (the latter regarded as the political mouthpiece of Terra Lliure), succeeded in bringing together more than 25,000 people under their flags on the national "Diada" of Catalonia.

Recently, a group of former leaders of Crida, headed by Angel Colom, asked to join the ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia], the historical Republican Party.

The reason they joined is that they feel the ERC could become the hub of the independence movement, in Colom's words.

This move is an attempt at the "abertzalizacion" [abertzale is Basque for patriotic] of the party that Josep Tarradellas headed in his day. This is the term that has caught on the strongest among Barcelona political observers.

## Hortala and the Crida

The rise of Joan Hortala to the leadership of Catalan Republicans, who have 50 deputies in the autonomous parliament, has been viewed with misgivings in the separatist movement and, according to some of its spokesmen, has prevented a mass influx of radical nationalists into the ERC.

Meanwhile, the Movement de Defensa de Terra, the Catalan organization that is comparable to Herri Batasuna, has suffered a crisis that has shattered what was until now a unified movement that presented no rifts to the outside.

What we are seeing is "the growth pains of the independence movement, inasmuch as the social base has expanded extraordinarily in recent years, and the objective now can no longer be merely agitation. The movement has to be politicized; answers have to be offered for the problems of the man in the street."

The above description of the new stage in the Catalan independence movement comes from one of its main spokesmen, Carles Castellanos, who heads up the "dissident" [critico] faction of the movement.

The other faction of the Movement de Defensa de Terra consists of the PSAN [Socialist Party of National Liberation], the best organized and most disciplined group in the movement, and numerous independent groups. The latter prefer to speak of the Patriotic Front: "All of the people with a national awareness should join the front and oppose Spanish and French occupation."

### Split in the PSAN

As far as the former are concerned, the Patriotic Front is nothing more than a proposal in keeping with the policy of the ERC, which brings together groups around more "reformist" nationalist positions. The latter feel that the rift created by the dissident faction is due, among other things, to "the pressures from a small Hispanophile clique: the Union of Marxist-Leninist Struggle."

Thus, there are three political groups that will be vying to represent separatist aspirations in their respective platforms. One of them, Republican Left, will wage its struggle through institutions, its parliamentary activity here and, if it can, once again in Madrid.

The other two organizations, which used to be together in the MDT, are not opposed to the armed struggle.

For the time being, the Crida would rather remain a civic alternative that can coexist with political organizations. Everyone respects its rallying power, although its potential could wane if Angel Colom makes headway.

The Crida, which at its outset merely supported the right to self-determination in the abstract, now straightforwardly proclaims the need for independence. It feels, however, that "the armed struggle may not be a useful method for the Catalan people."

There is something that they all agree on: Now is the time for the Catalan independence movement to take shape as a political force, instead of just remaining an accepted sentiment in all Catalan organizations.

#### Oppose ETA Presence in Catalonia

One of the most controversial issues within the separatist movement is the need for an armed struggle and, more specifically since September of last year, the presence of ETA in Catalonia.

Since the first attack that bore the ETA trademark, the police have been trying to ascertain the relationship between the Basque group and Terra Lliure. Are there regular contacts between the two or not? Is Terra Lliure involved in the attacks launched by ETA or not? To what extent?

Today we know that cooperation between the two armed groups has prompted rifts in Terra Lliure between those who favor it and those who feel that each group has its own territory.

The responses from political organizations have varied. The faction of the MDT to which the PSAN belongs has not taken a stand; Carles Castellanos says that he is opposed to "indiscriminate armed actions," and Angel Colom feels that "ETA's actions in Catalonia must cease, because it is a mistake to confuse our country's territory with Spanish territory."

All indications seem to be that the most recent attacks have prompted mounting fervor for "the Basque model" in some and in others fear over uncontrolled actions "that would subordinate the struggle in the Catalan countries to other political strategies."

8743

CSO: 3548/59

## OLOF JOHANSSON, CENTER PARTY VIEWED AT CHAIRMANSHIP CHANGE

## Johansson Stresses Environment Issues

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The New Center Party Leader"]

[Text] After a year and a half delay the Center Party this summer will appoint Olof Johansson as its new party leader.

When Thorbjorn Falldin left the leadership of the party in a dramatic way in December 1985, Johansson prepared to assume the post. He, and perhaps even more so his supporters in the youth league and other places, expected that Falldin would leave and Johansson would replace him.

But the actors in the Center Party at that time did not correctly estimate Falldin. He did not allow himself to be removed, but instead he resigned the chairmanship. And the method he chose for leaving did not give much maneuvering room to Johansson's supporters. Karin Soder became the party leader instead.

But she never stood out as a long term solution to the leadership problem in the Center Party. In fact she announced that she would leave the post before the December fracas broke out due to the efforts of the election committee. Quickly and joyfully, departure was changed to promotion.

On many occasions we have had reason to comment on the policies which Olof Johansson has stood for. Carefully stated, we have not always applauded his political contributions. Olof Johansson has represented a fairly clear minority group in the party on practical politics and in his view of nonsocialist cooperation. His policies have been more green than nonsocialist. And his own way has been more attractive to Johansson than the common nonsocialist line.

But that does not tell the entire story about how Olof Johansson is going to develop as party leader. The test that he is going to take is not how ready he is to cooperate with the other nonsocialist parties, but what ability he has to give the Center Party its own nonsocialist profile.



In the multiparty system that we have, the three nonsocialist parties each go their own way. That is obviously not a bad thing if they happen to have agreeing policies in a number of areas. But different types of "false" compromises are not especially desirable. For the nonsocialist voters, and indeed for the entire society, it is advantageous if different views and interests are represented as much as possible in the political process.

Compromises are part of the decision making process. When a government is being formed and when decisions are being made on different questions in the Riksdag, the parties must reach agreements which reflect the different interests and opinions.

The disheartening thing is if the nonsocialist politicians lack the independence to break out of the strong grip which social democrat problem formulation and habitual notions have on the country. Sometimes this seems to be one of the main ingredients of the policy which the green group of the Center Party has stood for. The environment is important, but it has been even more important to break the ties which bind their own party to the Conservatives. And that problem formulation has not been the Center Party's, but the Social Democrats'.

The threat with Olof Johansson at the helm of the Center Party is that the party will develop into a green support party for the Social Democrats.

A more promising picture of the future is that the Center Party will seriously follow the policy which is intended to break the grip of the big institutions, centralism and regimentation on Sweden.

#### Party Seen Pulled Leftward

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Feb 87 p 12

[Commentary by Ake Ekdahl: "Olof Johansson Becoming Nonsocialist Key Man-- Pull to the Left Concerns"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] On Saturday the founder of Asa-Nisse marxism will become the leader of the Center Party, candidate for prime minister, and nonsocialist key man. Refreshed and with all the leftist spots washed away he will be raised for public view by the voters at the extra party meeting in the Concert Hall.

The big question remains: How far to the left is Olof Johansson?

During recent weeks he has placed himself in the party's middle furrow. That was necessary before the party election. But Johansson does not recognize the left-right scale in politics.

Therefore Bildt and Westerberg are worried about Johansson's future rustling on the left. At the same time Carlsson and Feldt are hoping for a friend in need when things begin to get rough in the parliament.

It used to be said about Johansson that he was the only one after Gunnar Hedlund who understood the Center Party's policy ideas and devoted any

analysis to decentralism. He is also partly responsible for the party platform has been largely unchanged since the big times 15 years ago.

#### Man of Cooperation

Not even Olof Johansson has been able to explain Center Party ideology especially clearly and understandably. Or is there anyone who understands what was meant by Johansson's election speech the same day he was voted candidate for party leader: "The center of the people's movement is strongest when it is concentrated and functions decentralized." That sounds like a joke from Blandaren.

Johansson is a man of cooperation in politics. He wants the country to be run by broad majorities. Understanding legitimizes unpleasant decisions. Therefore he rejects bloc politics. His hardest criticism of the Social Democrats is against their fund and tax policies, because they cement the formation of blocs.

Occasionally he has said that the dividing line does not go between socialism and nonsocialism, but between centralists and decentralists. Between big and small business.

In the coming election he has taken a position for a nonsocialist government, but he is sharply critical of conservative concentration policies. Suspicion between Johansson and the Conservatives is mutual.

The picture of Olof Johansson as an Asa-Nisse marxist and antinuclear power hawk is distorted. It was brought about by the role in politics which he tried to act out to the best of his ability.

#### Green Guerilla

As a cabinet minister he fought against monster computers and nuclear power, which both represented total big business. As a young leader of Center Youth League he participated in the Green City Guerillas, who were going to save Greater Stockholm from elephant mania. That was just after Hedlund had made the party acceptable in the big cities. Together with Paul Grabo, Karin Andersson and Knut Nilsson, Johansson made life miserable for Hjalmar Mehr, director of city hall.

That was the first time that the general public met Sten Olof Hakan Johansson from Ljungby Assembly in Kalmar County. It was 1966.

Right then they began to see Johansson as renewal in the Center Party. How a sturdy interest party with its roots in the farmers' movement, and a visionary environmental party could be unified under the same hat bothered nobody then.

The young people in the Student Association and the Center Party Youth League (CUF) went so far as to demand the resignation of old Hedlund after the election of 1970.

There is one anecdote about Olof Johansson. It is true, and deals how he, against his will as chairman of CUF was forced to trudge up to Hedlund's residence on Drottning Kristina Avenue and present the decision of the youth league.

#### Courage Betrayed

After many cups of coffee and much conversation, his courage betrayed Olof Johansson and he left Hedlund without having carried out his mission. Hedlund found out what was going on in the party and departed of his own accord shortly thereafter.

Then followed Falldin's days of glory, a period full of center whiskers. All the center males in politics displayed bushy tufts of hair on their chins. Among the most splendid was Olof Johansson.

Soon he was elected to the party executive committee, and the CUF youths in Karlstad screamed his name, Olle, Olle, Olle, something entirely unique in the center people's movement. He would be the leader of the fourth generation of the Center Party, there was no doubt about that.

Then rather suddenly the ranks grew thin and the shouts died out. The years as minister of energy in Falldin's first government became a vendetta of intrigues and defensive fighting in a two-front war over nuclear power. Among the snipers in Government House was the present Conservative Party leader Carl Bildt.

#### Ministerial Government

Carl Tham (Liberal Party) and Anders Wikman (Conservative Party) criticized Johansson for political manipulation. The then head of Vattenfall, Jonas Norrby, said publicly that he lacked confidence in his highest superior, the minister of energy.

Beyond all that, Olof Johansson was criticized in the Riksdag for ministerial government. He had become involved in the concerns of nuclear power firms dealing with nuclear waste in Paris. Olof Johansson had acted on behalf of the Center Party under the cloak of a cabinet minister, and the expression "Falldin Parliamentarianism" was coined.

Furthermore he later angered the JO (parliamentary ombudsman) and the entire Swedish teacher corps when he publicly criticized Palme for having "schoolmaster's manners."

On the steps of Government House he aroused CUF youths to protest against the government's energy policies and caused turmoil in the government when he made a demand for more money for nuclear power safety, despite Falldin having raised the white flag, and Bohman saying that safety was 99 percent.

The Conservative Party leader and the Liberal Party leader, who was then Ola Ullsten, called him disloyal. Demands for Olof Johansson's resignation appeared in the press. Soon thereafter the entire government resigned.

In that situation, Olof Johansson had already been introduced as "the next prime minister" by Dalecarlia councilman Karl Boo.

#### Street Election

Now things did not go so smoothly, but Johansson succeeded with great effort in becoming vice chairman of the party. His election was described as a street election for the Center Party. Johansson's opponent was farmer Anders Dahlgren. It was considered to be a choice between renewal and continuity, between adventure and stability. The unpredictable won by 14 votes.

Furthermore Olof Johansson became the head of Stockholm Center, which was now all the more concerned.

Johansson advertised a reward of 3,000 kronor for the Center Club which could collect the most members in one year.

But nothing helped. Stockholmers and young people had grown tired of Center Party promises about nuclear power. In many places the last members of the Center Party laid down their flags, partly in protest against Johansson's inability to blow new life into the party.

If Falldin had ever desired a crown prince, he could have allowed Olof Johansson to step forward. But that never happened. Not even when Falldin resigned. And Johansson would never fight for himself. He became the activist, a speaker in the parliament of the street.

#### Piles of Paper

Johansson's workroom is an experience. From floor to ceiling around all four walls piles of old newspapers, Riksdag releases and old memoranda are balanced. The result of many years of drudgery. Strangely enough, he knows what is hidden in these piles of paper.

But as head of the party he needs somebody to help keep order in his agenda and papers, because he has always had great difficulty in organizing his life.

He has a real proletarian Smaland background. The alternative to his father's chicken farm was business college. But he never graduated. Politics, the family with his wife Inger and the two boys, took over his interest.

He is shy, sensitive, and looks at journalists like a sad cocker spaniel when questions defile the party.

#### Western Film

The family and politics are his two mainstays. Perhaps he will relax sometime in a genuine movie about life in the wild west.

"Now he has really grown up," said old Hedlund when he learned that his former speech writer and colleague is to take over the job as leader of the Center Party.

### Party Needs Strong Leader

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Mysterious and Green"]

[Text] Still politically mysterious to many, and therefore unusually burdened with their apprehensions and hopes, Olof Johansson was elected to be the new leader of the Center Party on Saturday.

When it became clear that he was the candidate of the nominating committee, the outcome was accompanied by ill-humored Conservative comments and hopeful Social Democrat invitations. "A just politician and cooperative man who can break up bloc politics," wrote a socialist newspaper, while a conservative colleague dejectedly confirmed, "With Olof Johansson as Center Party leader, the outlook for a three-party nonsocialist government is minimal."

The first thing a nonsocialist party in retreat must do to regain confidence and stability with the voters is to give a clear and direct statement about which type of government the party seeks. It is on this point that Olof Johansson has been troublesomely unclear. His critical position on bloc politics, like his statement that the Center Party always loses when it reacts together with an "extreme" party, has caused both the Social Democrats and the Conservatives to feel as they do now.

Uncertainty has been reinforced by the fact that Olof Johansson's political base since his own time as CUF chairman has been the radical youths of the party, and his actions in the three-party government of 1976-78.

But to be open for broad political solutions on individual questions, and to act against the nonsocialist alternative on big ones, are two different things. On the government question Olof Johansson has now given his message: the Center Party "obviously" works for a nonsocialist government. At the same time he has several times, including in the general political debate, said that a multiparty system should not be dealt with like a two-party system. Each party should report its own platform, and go to the voters on it. After that the question of government becomes of current interest.

He needs this maneuvering room in order to chisel out and anchor his party's political profile. Regional policies and decentralization play a major role, to judge from resolutions and statements. His problem is that the Center Party alone cannot act as a battering ram against a hardened concrete Social Democrat policy. The Center Party's main issues also depend on the agendas of other parties, and the environmental party is growing.

A weakened party needs a powerful and committed leader. Olof Johansson is perhaps not the personality to give his party a profile. Although he is

both spontaneous, committed and sensitive, and has now moved out of the shadow of Falldin and Soder, he makes a peculiarly vague and aloof impression. He has difficulty making a decision. For a party whose major problem is its obscurity these are unfortunate characteristics. His breadth, cleverness and professional skill are needed to offset them.

Possibly he is also incalculable. In any case that is the impression one gets from the account of the three-party government 1976-78 in Sven-Erik Larsson's discussion, "Governing by Coalition." As minister of energy, Olof Johansson was in the beginning willing to compromise in the nuclear power negotiations, while Falldin was unyielding. Then the roles changed: when Falldin finally accepted the loading compromise, Olof Johansson stiffened, which caused the government to split shortly thereafter. When the nuclear power question reached its peak he chose to leave those who had supported him--the uncompromising opponents of nuclear power.

These actions can both gain and damage him today. It is a feather in the cap for the committed friends of the environment, but he is risking being seen as an unreliable splitter by the ordinary nonsocialist voter.

It is a dilemma that the Center Party contains both an interest party and an idea party. In the election of 1985 the Center Party lost mainly the city voters. Should the party now invest in building up confidence in those who stood aside and become a more cultivated nonsocialist agricultural party, or try to draw back the shifting, urban voters? A farmers' party and a visionary environmental party are difficult to unite. Olof Johansson's strong ideological big-city attitude sounds as though he is trying to reduce the influence of the farmers.

Olof Johansson is going to need all of his distinct party feelings and his skill in opinion forming to answer before the voters the two questions which a former colleague of his is asking: Why should an ordinary nonsocialist person vote for the least nonsocialist party of the three? Why should a more radical and independent person vote for a party with an attractive platform, but in a nonsocialist bloc?

If Olof Johansson answers by choosing a third way, a distinctly "green" policy in the neighborhood of the environmental party, he must give up the nonsocialist connection that he claims to adhere to on the government question. That is a solution which has hardly any foundation with the voters, an alternative which exists in theory but not in reality.

#### SDP's Coalition Hopes Dashed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Feb 87 p 13

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "The Time is Limited"]

[Text] Nothing massive, but a gradual comeback in the opinion polls. That hope sent the old Center Party leader Gunnar Hedlund, ill at home with influenza, to his successor Olof Johansson when the latter was elected in the Concert Hall.

The greeting showed that Gunnar Hedlund still has a nose for politics.

The Center Party finds itself, following Thorbjorn Falldin's notorious departure from the party leader post and Karin Soder's illness, in a difficult political situation.

Large and sudden changes in the political party picture are excluded. Voter opinion is stable, both within the nonsocialist bloc and between the two political blocs. But the Center Party is confronting a laborious period.

For Olof Johansson and the new presidium it will be necessary to try to lay the foundation for a new and more modern policy which will fit the present Swedish society.

For Olof Johansson and his new colleagues in the presidium the time is limited. By the time of the party meeting in Borgholm in June at the latest, the party must find a platform which the Center movement in full unity will stand behind and which furthermore awakens confidence both in the countryside and in the big cities.

In many ways it was a new and fresher Olof Johansson who came forth in the Concert Hall. It appeared as though the quarantine that he imposed on himself because of the nominating committee's unskillful behavior at the time of Falldin's departure had made him well.

Previously Olof Johansson has often been quiet, reasoning and occasionally even brusque on the speaker's platform, and his best friends have sometimes become his worst enemies.

In his introductory speech in the Concert Hall, which he put together all by himself, he raised his pitch by a couple of octaves. He spoke with authority, conviction and strong commitment. And the ad libs he added to the written text were really the most interesting part.

It was a doubly earthy speech, a speech for the little people, and in all possible ways Olof Johansson sang the praises of decentralization.

But as is so often the case with the Center Party, the speech also contained everything between heaven and earth. That made it a little difficult to find the exact center of balance in Olof Johansson's first appearance as party leader.

On one point the situation is completely clear. As newly elected leader of the Center Party, Olof Johansson carried out his main political task by clearly declaring that the Center Party is fighting for a nonsocialist majority in the next election without thereby binding himself as to what a government should look like.

Olof Johansson is dreaming in the first place of a new middle government between the Liberal Party and the Center Party. The Conservatives are of

course conducting a difficult policy for the benefit of the more well-off in society.

But to openly argue in that direction can mean a death blow for Olof Johansson. Nonsocialist voters do not want a party to put itself in a worse position than others.

At the top of the Social Democrat Party it is hoped by a number of nostalgic persons that a new red-green coalition can be formed according to the model of the 50's which will again give the party a monopoly on government power.

The theory is that the Center Party, through a new coalition, will have very strong influence on political development in Sweden.

Olof Johansson killed this dream with a smash. It is when the Social Democrats find themselves in the minority that the Center Party has its greatest influence, he said in his dry pronouncement.

The conclusion is that Ingvar Carlsson in the foreseeable future does not have much to hope for in the case of Olof Johansson.

Chairman Olof Johansson has entered the nonsocialist trap, and the socialist excursions of the past have reduced his freedom of movement.

In the speech there were several obvious signs of hope for the Social Democrats, for safety's sake.

We are willing to cooperate, but that will not happen through demands for subordination. That is a jab directed at the Social Democrats.

And the Social Democrat agricultural policy was not worth a penny, and their attitude toward phasing out nuclear power did not awaken any sympathy in Olof Johansson.

And like onions on salmon he repeated that the Center Party is a clear opponent of collective membership in political parties, collective wage earner funds and a one-time tax on pensions.

Therefore the fight for nonsocialist marginal voters and the lounge lizards, who have a hard time deciding on their political bloc, is hardening.

If Olof Johansson is going to strengthen the position of the Center Party with the voters, as Gunnar Hedlund desires, it will be in a struggle with his nonsocialist brothers Carl Bildt and Bengt Westerberg.,

For Olof Johansson, as leader of the smallest nonsocialist party, this will mean a difficult balancing act between profiling and cooperation within the nonsocialist bloc.



## Difficult 'Balancing Act' Seen

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "The Party of Longing"]

[Text] The most prominent feature of the Center Party is the longing for a more friendly, gentler, greener and less largescale society. Politically this almost ideological longing for bygone days is a careful expression of the concerns experienced in confronting the boundless and uncertain, sometimes even threatening, future.

Against this background the Center Party does not allow itself to be placed on the traditional left-right political scale. It was also made clear at the installation of party chairman Olof Johansson that under his leadership the Center Party would fight to retain the possibility of cooperating with different parties on different questions. The newly elected chairman certainly made it clear that before the 1988 election it was of "primary interest for the Center Party to continue the Social Democrats in the Riksdag in a minority" (which they already are, if one does not count the VPK [Left Party Communists] as part of the government foundation) but at the same time one can see in Olof Johansson--in a different way than in his predecessors Thorbjorn Falldin and Karin Soder--a conscious effort to tone down the importance of ideological basic opposition to the Social Democrats.

It is too early to give a definite answer to what kind of a profile and appearance Olof Johansson is going to give the Center Party. The new party leader will not even give any guidance on such a central question as possible continued technical election cooperation with the Christian Democrats. On the party's central question for the last 15 years--phasing out nuclear power--Olof Johnson quoted from his predecessor Thorbjorn Falldin that a party "can never sell its soul." Of course such statements must be placed in perspective: at a party meeting they belong to the inevitable rhetoric; whether they also make up the party's policy when the energy policy as a whole is being formed will be the result only that the party has no possibility of influencing the direction of the policy.

This is a fundamental strategic problem for Olof Johansson and his party in the years to come. The dream of winning back the strength which in the elections of the 70's led to a very strong position in the government is, at least in the short term, in opposition to the need to show that the Center Party now already has influence over political developments.

In the 1985 election campaign one of the Center Party's problems was that more and more voters, including many who previously favored the party, no longer considered the party capable of governing. It would be a mistake not to clearly state that many people today are uncertain about which direction the Center Party will wander under the leadership of Olof Johansson. In central questions such as energy and tax policies the Center Party follows a political direction which does not immediately lend itself to unity in an eventual government cooperation with the Conservative and Liberal Parties,

despite the fact that the Center Party's tax policy is marked by all the possibilities which go with a lack of outline.

We have, however, previously seen examples of politicians who, when elevated to the post of party chairman, showed that they were capable both of guarding the party's traditional profile, and of taking the lead in a renewal adapted to the demands of the time.

The responsibility for the Center Party now rests on Olof Johansson.

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CSO:3650/79

## CARLSSON, OPPOSITION ASSESSED ONE YEAR AFTER NEW GOVERNMENT

## Cooperation With Nonsocialists Urged

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "To Go To Rosenbad"]

[Text] The image of Ingvar Carlsson is still being associated with the situation at the time he took office. Everyone knows that he personally did not want the position. But when death came to Olof Palme, Carlsson immediately realized that his job was to take over the leadership. We are thankful to him that the government at least was able to function that chaotic night of murder.

Ideologically the character of the Social Democrat Party did not change when Carlsson succeeded Palme. As the new party leader Carlsson has preferred to adhere to traditional social democrat ideas. Compared with the years when he was a somewhat fumbling "minister of the future" he has of necessity become more traditional.

Several years ago Carlsson could advance the idea that social democracy had become a prisoner of its own success. By that he meant that the shortage of resources was no longer a dominant social problem, and he regarded what he called the "social revolution" as largely completed. Now Carlsson talks of continuing social gaps and about the public sector as the foundation of welfare--in the way that Social Democrats used to do.

The reason why Carlsson is considered so different from Palme depends largely on differences in their personal style. The lively was replaced by the more reserved, the unconventional by the more formal, the provocative by the more conciliatory, etc. While Palme awakened strong feelings such as admiration or anger, Carlsson appears more as the representative of basic Swedish practicality. We can approve of him or not, but hardly more.

Of course it is the journalists who complain that politics have become boring with Carlsson. The "Westerberg effect" in the election of 1985 showed that the voters are tired of confrontation, and Carlsson fulfills that wish for a more low-pitched political dialogue. The only departure took place during the fall debate about the so-called one-time tax, but hard words between them in

December did not prevent Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg from agreeing two months later on defense.

Carlsson wanted to reach an agreement, but how did it happen that Westerberg dared? The explanation is in the personalities themselves. Many nonsocialist voters who were suspicious of Palme do not have the same categorical feelings about Carlsson.

For the nonsocialist parties resentment of Palme was a uniting force which in itself created a common position. Now that requirement is no longer as strong, and with new party leaders in the Conservative and Center Parties there has been freedom for centrifugal forces to work. Ingvar Carlsson has not had to exert himself to split the opposition.

The many invitations to conversations at Rosenbad are still regarded by the nonsocialists as annoying. The clearest critic is Olof Johansson, who has complained that Carlsson "gives the opposition examinations" without giving them a chance to lay their cards on the table.

Just this, however, should not be a reason to complain. A Social Democrat minority government which does not want to depend on communist support has a legitimate need to know where the nonsocialist parties stand. So long as no regular negotiations are conducted the opposition can feel free to take any position when government bills reach the Riksdag.

Even if conversations in Rosenbad should lead to political agreements, it cannot with justification be claimed that the position of the Riksdag has been weakened. In that case the comparison is with a considered form of minority parliamentarianism, in which the government puts forth its proposals blind, and later lets them stew in committee. This pattern was certainly tried during the short-lived Liberal Party government, but the result should not encourage imitation. A country cannot long be governed in that way.

A more serious question is whether the opposition is going to be prevented from exercising its limited role, as claimed by Conservative Riksdag member Anders Bjorck. But no real reason for such apprehension has been expressed. Not even on the question of the Palme Investigation, in which the nonsocialist party leaders are believed to have access to the extent they themselves wanted, has the opposition bound itself to refrain from criticism. If error or neglect has been committed by the government it is its responsibility--nobody else's.

The benefits of the Rosenberg conversations are that with them Ingvar Carlsson can contribute to setting up a better conversation climate between the Social Democrats and the nonsocialists. It is valuable that the party leaders are meeting, even if the result is neither action nor agreement. To go to Rosenbad is actually also a way to show self-reliance.

## Foreign, Security Policies Attacked

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial by Hans L. Zetterberg: "Ingvar Carlsson's First Year"]

[Text] Words of praise are flowing for Ingvar Carlsson's first year as party chairman and prime minister. We seem to have a need to give the man from Boras our confidence. Praises on his first anniversary as prime minister reveal more about the emotional state of the country than about the prime minister's person and policies.

It is one of Ingvar Carlsson's finest traits, however, that he is humble and he understands what the praises mean. Most are reduced to uselessness in such a situation; Lyndon Johnson after the murder of Kennedy is an example.

Our mass media are now shaping Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson into a figure larger than life. Obviously that will cause problems for journalists in the future.

The gilding is going to act like a telephone negotiation. It will be a much greater hindrance for the media in their future reporting about Carlsson than any news hungry or silent press secretary could be.

Many Swedes also have a need to let predecessor Olof Palme stand out as a saint. The bloody flag on Sveavagen has released feelings and opinions which the living Palme seldom or never aroused. Our own need for belief, relationships and heroes also takes over from reality.

In Sweden we now have two political heroes, one living and one dead. The leadership of the living hero is being awarded a significance that it does not have, at least not yet. It simply feels good and right to live under Carlsson. The memory of the dead hero fills us with all we want of current history, even that which Palme never came close to achieving.

Ingvar Carlsson is the first Social Democrat Party leader who is totally an organization person, a man who is of, by and for the social democrat movement. He is what they call in political literature an "apparatnik."

Branting and Palme came from the upper class and had other experiences and perspectives than those of the party. Per Albin Hansson was an intellectual within the working class, a journalist used to listening to other signals than those of the party.

Erlander belonged for fairly many years to Lund University or its back yard. He was a perpetual undergraduate, something which is both fine and necessary if one is to drink in the academic perspective without being a professor.

Carlsson also studied at Lund University. He was a sturdy plowhorse and graduated after a couple of years. That is too short a time to gain a literate perspective on his surroundings. Carlsson personifies Swedish strength, but he has only the perspective and experience of an apparatnik.

Carlsson resembles an intellectual politician, however, because he is always seeking new knowledge. But contrary to the usual mental worker he does not get married to his ideas. Thus he was not excessively disturbed when the party congress refused to share his conception of reality in the future report about options in public service.

A more intellectual politician in the same situation would have become upset, written clarifying articles, entered heated debates for his conviction. But an apparatnik is not so fully developed as a person. He believes that in conflicts between common sense and reality on the one hand and the decision of the party congress on the other, the decisions of the congress are dominant.

Ingvar Carlsson's strength does not mean that he is a pusher. He is certainly a man of the apparatus, but he respects others with unassuming openness.

Palme had little use for his law professors at Stockholm College when he studied there. They spent too much time on other than teaching.

Carlsson has more respect for knowledge and research. He is very popular in the universities where he finds it easy to enter into a dialogue. He has also an unsentimental tone in his contacts with business.

He has shown an openness that makes conversation easy and welcome. In short, with Carlsson the Social Democrats are back to the traditional candid leadership which is welcome both within and outside the party, and both within and outside state administration.

In the midst of his personal sorrow over Palme, Carlsson handled the crisis in the party and in the country which followed the assassination in an exemplary manner. The murderer made a basic error if he thought that chaos or panic would break out or weakness be displayed in the machinery of government. The country knew immediately that it had a leader. In an impressive way, Carlsson utilized the contacts with foreign statesmen offered by Palme's funeral.

But the trip to Moscow was a failure. The submarine violations continue. There are not as many telephone calls abroad from the prime minister's office as in Palme's time. The horizons are shrinking at Rosenbad. "We Are Building the Country" is Carlsson's song, and the country is the movement's Sweden.

Unfortunately the social democrat songbook does not contain a song entitled "We Are Defending the Country." Carlsson's unwillingness to really arm for the defense of the country's borders could be the only mention that his first year as prime minister gets in future history books.

The worst thing that happened during Carlsson's first year as prime minister was the one-time tax. It is plundering the pension savings of the private sector of about 18 billion kronor. The entire PTK [Negotiation Cartel for Salaried Employees in the Private Business Sector] agreement area has been affected. Much of the money will be used to cover holes in the budget of the public sector. A smaller portion will be used for cash payments to the largest client group of the public sector, the pensioners.

The one-time tax means the collapse of good judgment and valuation for the Carlsson government. The combination of arrogance and improvisation was amazing.

The one-time tax was implemented without program work in the party, without public investigation and against the advice of the Law Council. Implementation happened so fast and was so poorly prepared that the bill diverged from what Carlsson said in the government's explanation of how the money would be used.

That could perhaps be forgiven. But Carlsson forgot the widow's trifle: Pension savings are holy. It is the duty of the state to protect pension savings, not to take and dissipate them. That was the obligation of the state before the introduction of universal suffrage, and it remains the obligation of the state after the introduction of universal suffrage.

Civil rights are to protect individuals from aggression by the state. Carlsson tried to fix it so that civil rights legitimized aggression by the state against pension savings in the private sector. That was weak, and it was gruesome to hear the LO [Trade Union Confederation] congress applaud the power language and the historically stupid ideas.

In the Riksdag vote on the one-time tax there was a hidden conflict. The Social Democrat members of the Riksdag who should have wanted to support the private employees among their voters did not dare to. They would not be put up for reelection if they voted against the one-time tax. The prime minister did what no party leader should do: He placed his elected representatives before the vote in the position of being either Riksdagsmen or men of honor. And that was entirely obvious to him.

There are certainly dangers when a country is led by an apparatnik who is strong to satisfy the needs of his movement. It is much too easy for such a person--even if it is the sensitive Ingvar Carlsson--to put himself above civilized judgments and human worth.

#### Opposition Leaders View Carlsson

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Feb 87 p 6

[Interviews by Elisabeth Crona with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and opposition party leaders: "The Opposition After One Year With Ingvar Carlsson: Matter-of-Fact, Well Read, a Little Divided, Expectant"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] In a few days Ingvar Carlsson will have governed Sweden for one year. How has he governed? With all of his discussions with party leaders has he tried to introduce any form of "collective government"? Does he want more cooperation in politics? Is he consciously giving his cabinet ministers more maneuvering room, or is he a weaker prime minister than Olof Palme?

SVENSKA DAGBLADET has asked all of the opposition parties in the Riksdag, a representative of the Social Democrat Riksdag Group--and the prime minister himself.

"I have said that in certain areas I would try to find unified solutions. In that connection I have mentioned defense, energy policy and perhaps taxes as examples," said Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson to SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

"But beyond that I will not have any form of collective government. I have no such ambitions. I think we should have an opposition which limits the government. But there are certain areas which are suited for cooperation.

"As a minority government we must generate support in the Riksdag, and that normally happens in committees."

He went through the questions which have caused so much discussion during recent months:

"On defense matters there is merit in unity, especially considering the outside world. I also believe that energy matters are of the same character.

"What will happen with taxes is more uncertain, but we are going to have conversations to identify the situation. Thereafter we will decide whether to continue the discussions with the parties.

"It is just by chance that there are a number of questions now which we have expected to argue about. As we approach the election this will not be quite so common," said Ingvar Carlsson.

Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg does not believe that the prime minister "wants to develop conversations beyond their present level."

"There have been special reasons for the discussions which have taken place."

But new Center Party leader Olof Johansson is afraid that Ingvar Carlsson's formula--no party cards on the table--can lead to the opposition parties becoming prisoners of the party leader discussions.

"When we are assembled he conducts a kind of oral examination of the opposition: Where do you stand? That is the way it was with the energy question, and there is a risk that it will be like that on taxes. The government can easily use that as a method of reading the opposition. We do not know, when we are sitting there, whether he is really with us or not."

During the discussions on energy Olof Johansson opposed the prime minister's informal contacts at the same time as the five-party discussions. It was not right for the Social Democrats to conduct separate negotiations.

The party leaders exempted discussions of the Palme Investigation from their criticism. "It was right to seek contact and unity," said the Center Party leader. On that issue party politics must not interfere.



Defense also has a special character, he said. Parties traditionally try to agree. But Olof Johansson attacked the government's way of concluding the discussions.

"I had a feeling that Ingvar Carlsson came with committed votes. He was not dealing with equal opponents.

"The coming tax negotiations run the risk of being strange if the Social Democrats are not ready to lay their cards on the table. But the government has avoided doing that on both the energy question and taxes. All they have to submit is a sketch."

Conservative Party leader Carl Bildt said that Ingvar Carlsson during the discussions waits out the other party leaders.

"Generally speaking he aims to make up to the Liberal Party, and he has had some success.

"He does not want to build a coalition with anyone. On the contrary, he wants to split the nonsocialists.

"One can talk of a 'collective government' on only one question," said Carl Bildt. "That is on the question of the Palme Investigation, and there it is good that we had consultations.

"On the other questions which we discussed, it was more a question of maneuvering by the government. On defense there was really no negotiation by anyone. The issue consequently turned into a separate agreement. The discussions about energy were mostly acted out for the spectators."

Carl Bildt made a comparison with Olof Palme. When he was the new prime minister he was in the beginning very interested in having party leader discussions, an interest which waned.

VPK [Left Party Communists] leader Lars Werner spoke about the traditional Wednesday discussions with Palme in the 80's. He informed the other party leaders about his trips abroad.

"A question such as the concept of death was also suitable for party leader discussions," said Lars Werner, who sees a risk in the latest negotiations "over the heads of the Riksdag."

"It is reasonable to discuss the Palme Investigation, but not issues such as defense, energy and taxes. It is illegal to take them out of the Riksdag.

"We went to the energy discussions to hear the views of the government. But Ingvar Carlsson just asked us, and said nothing himself."

"If I already had an opinion when I went to talk with them, then they would have had a better reason to criticize me," responded Carlsson to the criticism of the opposition parties.

Office manager Sven Dahlin of the Social Democrat Riksdag Group, who has known Ingvar Carlsson since his SSU days, gives his background and analysis of the prime minister's contacts with the opposition.

"He is basically an Erlander man. His thoughts on cooperation are governed by getting a strong base for the government. A remaining period must be found for the important decisions being made in defense, energy and taxes. The value of this is so great that he enters into compromises."

Within the opposition one can notice uncertainty in the judgments of Ingvar Carlsson.

Lars Werner said, "I believe that his discussions with us mean both that he is making a virtue out of a necessity, and that he wishes to lower the level of debate and get a more unrestrained political debate in Sweden. He has the opportunity now that there are several new party leaders.

"On the other hand," he said, "there is Ingvar Carlsson's ability. He is really a political controversialist and a hard negotiator.

The VPK leader has had long experience in negotiating with Ingvar Carlsson.

"Palme always sent Carlsson to negotiate with us. He is matter-of-fact, well read, hard and pushes questions.

"Ingvar Carlsson is a little divided," believes Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg. "He has made speeches which were both dogmatic and demagogic. But on the issues he has shown respect for facts. He listens more than Palme did."

"So far Ingvar Carlsson has been watchful and kept a low public profile," said Carl Bildt. "But in many respects his government year include a return to social democrat dogmatism."

He noted how the prime minister presented the result of the party leader discussions.

"He goes out and delivers hard, short statements. On the other hand Olof Palme engaged in a snorting dialogue with the journalists, and thus with the public."

For the opposition the discussions, according to the Conservative Party leader, have revealed weak points in the government. He especially mentioned Minister of Justice Sten Wickbom and Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson.

Sven Dahlin believes that Ingvar Carlsson has his special style in dealing with members in the government.

"He is more likely to give the individual ministers maneuvering room than Olof Palme was. Palme became so involved that he could not stay out of other people's areas."

Ingvar Carlsson himself will not admit to any new or different line.

"I have good cabinet ministers and there is no reason for me to get involved in their work," he said. "During all the years that I was a departmental minister Olof Palme very seldom got involved in mine."

Lars Werner's thesis is that the cabinet ministers have taken up their old positions, with three central ministers: prime minister, foreign minister and finance minister. Olof Palme dominated his government. But Sten Andersson is really the foreign minister in Carlsson's government. And Kjell-Olof Feldt has taken over Gunnar Strang's position.

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CSO:3650/88

## SAUDI ARABIA SEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN GULF WAR DEVELOPMENTS

Istanbul TERCuMAN in Turkish 21 Dec 86 p 4

[Prof Fahir Armaoglu article: "Detente in the Gulf"]

[Text] Iraqi head of state Saddam Husayn's 1-day visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with King Fahd on 28 December have revived hopes of a peaceful end to the Iran-Iraq war. In particular, the fact that this visit took place in the aftermath of Iran's Karbala-4 offensive, which has ended in failure and heavy casualties for Iran, and coincided with the intensification of the inter-Arab contacts for the Islamic summit to be held in Kuwait on 26 January also signals that there is a move toward a detente in the Gulf.

It should not be overlooked that in the Gulf war, now in its seventh year, it is not the belligerents, Iraq and Iran, but Saudi Arabia that has been the focal point. The takeover of power in Iran by the Khomeyni regime in February 1979 and its efforts to "export revolution" from the very first have frightened Saudi Arabia most of all. The launching of "sectarian struggle" by Khomeyni at a very early stage and his attempt to transform the "sectarian factor" into a tool for political supremacy, let alone the possibility that Iran might establish a strategic dominance in the Gulf, have driven Saudi Arabia willy-nilly into reacting. And when the strategic factor rather than the religious one got Kuwait to move, a Kuwaiti-Saudi front emerged and took up a position alongside Iraq when the Iraq-Iran war broke out.

A great change in the position of Saudi Arabia has become visible in recent months. Riyadh has recently made a manifest effort to relax its relations with Tehran and has made effective use of oil to this end. The dismissal of Zaki Yamani, who had opposed the production cutbacks Iran had insisted upon, the decision to raise the price of oil to \$18 barrel for a period of 6 months starting 1 January and the establishment of production quotas at the recent OPEC meeting constituted the largest concessions made by Saudi Arabia to Iran. If Saudi Arabia had not said "yes" to production cutbacks, Iran would long have kept on suffering agonies over oil revenues.

There were two particular reasons why Saudi Arabia was driven to such an "about-face" in its policy on Iran. The first was the serious effect the

great drop in oil prices in 1986 had on Saudi Arabia, too. Thus, by taking care of its own interests through a rise in oil prices and at the same time opening the door to improving relations with Iran by making a concession to it, Saudi Arabia has killed two birds with one stone.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has also observed that 6 years of war have considerably weakened the Khomeyni regime, which has thus ceased to be a serious danger. The havoc wreaked by the war and the growing opposition to the regime at home raise questions about the future of the Khomeyni regime. This situation has eased Saudi Arabia's concern.

There is no doubt that if Saudi Arabia had not received certain signals from Iran regarding peace in the Gulf, it would not have so readily agreed to the concession to Iran on oil. In fact, Iran's statement that it will attend the Islamic conference in Kuwait after an absence of several years is one of these important signals. Iran wants to get into a new environment and in turn, wants peace in the Gulf--a fact that is not lost on Iran.

To put it in a nutshell, if there is to be peace in the Gulf, the initiative for this is largely in Saudi Arabia's hands.

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CSO: 3554/147

## POLITICAL PROFILE OF SHP LEADER ERDAL INONU GIVEN

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 Dec 86 pp 1, 8

[Text] The leader of the SHP has kept intact the "enigmatic" image that he has maintained ever since he entered politics. Who is Erdal Inonu, what does he stand for, what are his thoughts and plans, has he a chosen goal? Is Erdal Inonu a man who never gets angry, who never gives way to irritation? Or is this an impression that stems from indifference, from a lack of concern? Or, is he misjudging things, is he not aware of the rapid erosion in his party? Is he pinning his confidence on something or is he just thinking, "If things don't work out, I will pull up stakes and leave"?

These are questions to which the specific answers are not known, political circles or in public opinion, so everybody has different answers to them.

Recent events in Ankara may provide a clue: Sevinc Inonu, known to have opposed her husband's entry into politics and who almost never visited the capital earlier on, is now often by her husband's side. They were together at the concert organized by the Presidential Symphony Orchestra in honor of Ismet Inonu's memory, and they went to meet the president together. Sevinc is furnishing the vacant apartment owned by Erdal Inonu in the Pembe Kosk quarter to make it fit for occupancy. It looks as if this will become the Ankara residence of the couple. The recent strong statement by Sevinc on the subject of dangerous detergents, a statement that has made a strong--and favorable--impact, particularly among housewives, has conveyed to political circles in Ankara that Mrs Inonu is warming up to the role of wife of the leader of the main opposition.

It looks, in any case, as if Erdal Inonu has conquered "the home citadel" peacefully, with patience and persuasive powers.

Patience, persuasive powers, and the peaceful option... . Political circles in Ankara are gradually coming to talk of Erdal Inonu's plans to conquer "the citadel within the party," followed by "the citadel of power," with the same method.

According to those who know Erdal Inonu intimately, there is an incorrect assessment of the personality of the leader of the SHP that stems from

the belief that he entered politics reluctantly, under pressure, and much against his inclinations. But those who know him say that he is a totally political animal. A colleague of his, who has watched his academic career from the very beginning, says:

"Erdal's promotion from assistant lecturer to professor is due to his truly superior scientific capabilities. But his election to dean of his faculty and rector of his university is due to the fact that he is at the same time a terrific political animal. Moreover, he was also elected chairman of the commission he served on at UNESCO. Before the advent of YoK [Higher Educational Council], to be elected dean or rector in our country used to be very difficult, indeed, and handling the backstage politicking for it was more difficult than doing the same thing in politics. And this is especially true regarding UNESCO, where 150 countries are represented...."

This shows that Inonu the son, like Inonu the father, has the ability to keep foxes in his head, even though he may not have the 40 foxes that the latter was credited with.

If Erdal Inonu is not overly concerned with Ecevit's "stealing bricks" from his party, this is explained mainly by his view of the defectors as people without the capacity to steal bricks from the party organization itself. What is more, according to Erdal Inonu, what has happened will shake the grassroots not of the SHP, which are solid, but the thin grassroots of the DSP.... He considers that when those who have left see this and come to their senses, and when they get to know the Ecevit couple at close quarters, then the DSP will fall further back long before 1988 comes around.

How does Erdal Inonu, "the political animal," so described by his colleague, plan to conquer first "the citadel within the party" and then "the citadel of power?"

What Inonu is contemplating is "a congress open to all comers." This congress is scheduled for 1987, where all accounts will be settled, all horse trading conducted, and the race to power will then be on. With great flourish....

What precedes the congress, in the opinion of Inonu the son, is "stuff and nonsense" in the famous phrase of Inonu the father. Naturally, the SHP wants to keep its parliamentary group intact as much as possible and has declared that there will be no difficulty in the nomination of those members of this group who integrate with the party organization or who achieve an unstoppable surge in public opinion. But an inclination to say "goodbye and good luck" to those who cannot contemplate this and wish to defect dominates both the SHP parliamentary group and the SHP party organization.

Is Inonu not aware that there are two candidates for the position of SHP leader? Not very likely, according to political commentators in Ankara. These two are, of course, Aydin Guven Gurkan and Deniz Baykal.

There is one difference, though. Gurkan was counting on the supposition that "Erdal Inonu will get up and go by the time the party congress is held."

It is now clear that he will not go.

So, will Baykal enter the running as a candidate at the November congress, not against Gurkan--as contemplated--bit against Inonu?

One would not think so.

The most likely eventuality is that Gurkan and Baykal will accept posts as "loyal seconds" to Inonu and develop tactics and strategies for the "post-Inonu" period.

There does not seem to be much difficulty in envisaging Erdal Inonu leading the SHP into the 1988 elections. "The citadel within the party" looks all set to be conquered.

But how about "the citadel of power?"

That is a bit more up in the air, and Inonu's sole rival, Ozal, is also an extraordinary politician who keeps foxes in his head.

Ismet Inonu had a reputation for keeping the tails of the foxes in his head from ever touching each other--despite having to contend with 40 of them.... Both Erdal Inonu and Turgut Ozal have far fewer foxes. But they both know that when their tails touch each other, they will cause a short circuit which will reduce to ashes either Inonu's dreams for an SHP administration or Ozal's present one.

13184/9190

CSO: 3554/147



## STUDENTS ARRESTED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 31 Dec 86 pp 1, 8

[Text] From the newsroom--Following the detention of several students in raids on a number of student associations in Ankara, mainly the Student Association of the Social Sciences Faculty and circles connected with YARIN DERGİSİ, one student was detained and five others were released. As the number of students on hunger strike in protest against the oppression of the associations and the detention of their fellows rose to 47 in Ankara, 19 others in Izmir and 10 in Bursa also went on a hunger strike.

According to a report from CUMHURİYET's Ankara Bureau, the following who had been taken into custody last week have been sent to the Office of the Prosecutor of the State Security Court in Ankara: Vahit Kanig, Suat Tekeli, Serap Sen, Emin Bebek (managing editor of the periodical OGRENCİ POSTASI), Beyhan Sunal (news editor, YARIN DERGİSİ) and Nesrin Hocaoglu (advertising and subscriptions bureau editor of YARIN DERGİSİ and a member of its technical services). Vahit Kanig, one of the students, was detained in custody on grounds that "he had acted on behalf of the illegal Turkish Labor Party" and was sent to the Ankara central prison. The others were set free.

It was disclosed that the 47 persons on hunger strike in Ankara, including 43 students, will continue their action over the New Year's Eve period. In a statement made on behalf of the students, it was disclosed that 11 of the students who underwent a medical checkup by Ata Soyer, secretary general of the Ankara Physicians Union, had abandoned their strike on health grounds. The students on strike also wrote an open letter addressed to President Kenan Evren, declaring that the student associations were established in pursuit of their legal rights and are determined to stay within legal limits. The letter said: "Our proposal for the amendment of article 44 of YoK [Higher Education Council] and the campaign that is being waged within the framework of this proposal constitute an example of this activity that is legal and based on goodwill."

The students also claimed in their letter that police authorities have made "contradictory statements" in connection with their detained fellow students and that the latter have been tortured. The students also asked

President Kenan Evren to agree to meet them. While the students also sent a telegram to Necmettin Karaduman, president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to protest the detention of their fellow students, it was announced that Mustafa Okan, news editor in charge of YARIN DERGISI, has also joined the hunger strike.

The CUMHURİYET Aegean Bureau in Izmir reports that the hunger strike in Izmir, supported by 12 student unions, began yesterday with the participation of 19 students. At a press conference held at the SHP, they said that the aim of the hunger strike is to protest "the attacks directed against student associations and the detention of association members." The students stated that "our times are witnessing acts of pressure and terrorism directed against student youths as part of the community in general."

The CUMHURİYET Bureau in Bursa reports that 10 students, including members of the board of the Student Association of the Economics and Management Sciences Faculty of Uludag University, have gone on strike. The students announced that they have begun a hunger strike to protest the oppression of students in Turkey, the closing down of their associations and the detention of some of their colleagues. They first called at the SHP building, where they stayed for some time. Then they went to the Urun bookstore where the owner, Volkan Akdeniz, told the students that he supported them and that they could continue their hunger strike in the cellar of the bookstore.

Ismail Zengin, a first-year student at the Engineering Department of Cukurova University, was detained by the political police in a raid on the Balcali student hostel 2 nights ago.

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## EVREN, OZAL COMMENTS ON HEADCOVER ISSUE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 p 12

[Text] Ankara, Special--President of the Republic Kenan Evren, in his New Year address has stated his view regarding the turban controversy and said, "Let them wear whatever they want on the street." Evren said that the state has a certain order and a government employee cannot come to the workplace bearded and wearing a turban.

Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, on the other hand, while explaining his opinion about turbans to the reporters on New Year's eve, said that the problem will be solved by the universities' acceptance of a modern outlook.

President Kenan Evren, while celebrating the New Year with the students at Gazi Female Student Dormitory, stated that it is wrong to interpret the new year as a Christian belief and said, "There is no relation between the New Year and religion."

Evren, when he saw that there were students with turbans and head scarves at the girls' dormitory, explained his views as follows:

"There are children with head scarves here. But I didn't say anything. Let them wear whatever they want at home, on the street and in their free time, no one will interfere. This place is their home. However, the state has a certain order. A civil servant cannot come to work with a full beard and a turban; if he does, it will be entered in his record.

"The situation is similar at schools. If someone comes in a religious robe, if someone else says that he will apply Islamic rules, or comes dressed in shorts, shall we condone their actions?"

In the meantime President Evren accepted an oil painting presented by a student in turban.

## Ozal's View on Turbans

The Ozal family observed the new year at the Residence of the Prime Minister, and the prime minister had his first chat of the year with reporters on the current issue of turbans.

The prime minister brought a new dimension to the turban discussion during the conversation, contending that a modern appearance could also involve a turban.

The prime minister stated that the legislation on attire does not pertain to ladies' covering or uncovering their heads. He said, "If one believes in covering her head, our universities have a modern approach of accepting it and the matter is over and done with. The turban is possible." "As far as I know there are no rules against wearing turbans or headscarves," the Prime Minister commented. However, he also added that he is not an authority on this matter.

#### Pope's Headgear

The prime minister, who said that freedom of religion and conscience is as old as the history of mankind, said the following:

"Because of this people have been obliged to migrate from one place to another. Some Muslims left for Ethiopia; and in the Middle Ages in Europe there were big struggles between Catholics and Protestants. They put pressure on people. The renowned Luther, one of the founders of Protestantism, said that he would prefer the Ottoman palace to praising the Pope's headgear. In the Ottoman state people from different religions were able to express their beliefs freely. Consequently, there is the condition of not obstructing another's freedoms in any way.

"Turkey is a secular country; our president has also expressed the meaning of this. It does not mean atheism as some want to imply. Secularism is not to interfere in anybody's religion and understanding. You may be religious and have a certain belief, but it belongs to you, you cannot force someone else to believe. This is secularism. On the other hand, you cannot condemn anyone for what he believes in.

"When it comes to attire, of course, our laws and constitution contain provisions that certain clothing cannot be worn. These laws do not pertain to whether ladies cover their heads, but rather to banning certain attire. For example, hodjas cannot wear their distinctive dress outside. You cannot wear a turban (for males) and, besides, when you go to school, everyone cannot wear anything they like, one has to respect the situation there. In other words, there is no sense in having long and unkept hair and beard and wearing baggy trousers. If they have adopted a certain dress code, you wear that. If covering your head is part of your belief, our universities would accept if they had a modern outlook and the matter would be closed. The turban would be possible.

#### The Council of State Decision

"I do not know to what degree the Council of State can interfere in these matters. What Council of State did was this: They expelled a female student from school for covering her head. The Council of State has decided that they have the right to do so. That is all! The universities know best themselves. I do not approve of this matter being exaggerated this much.

"Do you get angry with the students? If I told you to cover your head, would that be right on my part? If you do not want to, you stand up and object. The opposite is also possible; I cannot insist that someone uncover her head."

12990/12948

CSO: 3554/159

## NEW TURK-IS GENERAL SECRETARY ANNOUNCES GOALS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Ozer Oral: "First Announcement by New General Secretary of TURK-IS: 'We Will Make Feathers Fly'"]

[Text] TURK-IS's new general secretary, Emin Kul, said: "Our goal is to provide a new and dynamic structure to TURK-IS." TURK-IS General Secretary Kul indicated that arguments and hard feelings at the convention are things of the past and added that they will tour the country from one end to the other. Kul said, "We will make the feathers fly."

Kul said that the rank and file expects "activity rather than inertia" from the general secretary's office. He emphasized the need to speak with the troubled organization and patiently explain the difficulties and ways to solve them. He mentioned the subject of action and said the following:

"The labor movement is a dynamic movement by nature. Advancements of labor rights in the world did not occur in inertia. Because the labor movement is a creative force it has rather strong feelings about collecting what is due it from society. Of course, there are legal ways of doing this, and there are practical ways (action and use of force). The society and the system should pay labor's rightful due through legal means. If this path is closed, naturally various kinds of action come to the agenda. However, it is wrong to assume that things can be changed overnight. This is an operation spread over time. The situation is similar in the rest of the world."

TURK-IS General Secretary Emin Kul, when answering a question regarding reports that a new confederation similar to DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] may be founded, said that unity plays a very important role in the success of the labor movement and pointed out that the labor movement which unites can overcome the problems much better than the one which is divided. He said, "It is not possible to deny the large role of TURK-IS in the advancement of labor rights until now. However, TURK-IS became successful over time and within a legal framework. If there is a void created by TURK-IS, a new confederation may be founded."

When asked "Is there a void?" Emin Kul answered: "I don't believe that there is a big void right now. But I also accept that there are some reservations regarding this matter. In the new year, TURK-IS is facing the task of filling this void and removing these reservations."

The TURK-IS general secretary indicated that because its political, economic and social expectations are not adequately met, society directs attention towards the labor movement and its organizations which are the most dynamic sector of the society. He said that practices carried out to date would be reevaluated and added:

"First we will put ourselves in order. We will revitalize our relations with our organization and other institutions. We will get rid of doubts, such as the void issue. We will put our relations with institutions attached to the confederation in better order.

"We will start an era of renewal. We will open our doors to the intelligentsia. We will evaluate our decisions and practices by consulting with other circles. We will study our destination from another perspective. We will be open in these matters."

Kul stated that the subject of democracy will take priority in education "because everyone describes democracy differently... Just like the description of an elephant by blind people, each touching different parts of the animal."

Emin Kul said that their reaction to the closure of DISK was one of worry and distress, and that such an action is incompatible with free trade unionism. He emphasized the "need to renew and restore policies pursued by TURK-IS and said that these matters would be discussed at the first meeting of the board of directors.

12990/12948  
CSO: 3554/159

## FREEDOM OF RELIGION, THOUGHT LINKED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 p 8

[Column by Yurdakul Fincanci: "Freedom of Religion"]

[Text] For 60 odd years, since the foundation of the Republic, the debate over fundamentalism has not quieted down. If this debate sometimes seems muddled, one must look for the reason in our passion for creating a confusion of concepts. We think that at the root of the fundamentalism debate lies to a great extent the murkiness created by the work "laic."

The word "laicus" in Latin and "laikos" in Greek means people, individuals outside of the clerical class. In the Christian world where the church is a social institution, the word "laic" is a comprehensive concept which indicates life outside of the religious world.

The word "laic" or "secular" was introduced to the Turkish society at the period when the caliphate was abolished; however, it is difficult to say that after 60 odd years this concept has taken root even today. The religion if Islam is not institutionalized as Christianity is; for a long time political and social life has not been able to go beyond a one-dimensional state. For these reasons, "secular" has been a gerrymandered word to us. To a Muslim, the mosque is a place to meet God. The church, on the other hand, is not only a religious institution to the Christians, but a social, educational, cultural, and sometimes even a political institution as well. Catholic philosophy has created a church hierarchy separate from the people. Islamic thought, on the other hand, has not formed a clerical class separate from the people. This is part of the reason why the concept "secular" which says a lot to the Christian world, is nonexistent in the Muslim world.

Ataturk's intention in abolishing the caliphate was not to separate the people from religion. However, the word "laic" has been stretched to mean atheism, through perhaps distrustful, perhaps deliberate interpretations. In fact, the best concept to define the revolution of abolishing the caliphate would be the concept of "temporal" which is the translation of "securaris" in Latin. If we could have put across an accurate description of the undertaking, we would have prevented the debate on fundamentalism, or at least the confusion of concepts.



Ataturks's intention was to prevent the spiritual and temporal points of view from influencing and guiding one another. The administration of the state was to be left to civilians who have a contemporary world view. The administration of the mosque, on the other hand, was to be handed to hodjas who adhere to the metaphysical view of Islam. We believe that this was Ataturk's view of the problem of separating the matters of state and religion.

Nevertheless, although with the abolition of the caliphate, religion's involvement with the state ended, state interference in religion did not. This was probably impossible under the social conditions of the day. But, ultimately, the revolution was incomplete.

Government was purged of religious considerations; however, religion could not gain the same freedom. Religion, in the popular expression used for the press, was free "by law."

Many measures were taken starting with the foundation of the Department of Religious Affairs to take religion under state control. Remember the developments following changing the call to prayer to Arabic during Democratic Party days. Classes in religion were introduced to the curriculum of elementary and middle schools. These classes were even made compulsory by the 1982 Constitution. The Ministry of National Education has established imam-preacher schools and Koran courses, as if it were the "Ministry of Religious Education." Broadcasts of Koran or Mevlit (long poem celebrating the birth of the Prophet Mohammed) were started on television. The politician who stopped taling during the call to prayer started considering it the thing to do to perch on the podium like a thoughtful turkey. Politicians compete with one another to get in line for Friday prayers in Anatolia which they tour like traveling hodjas. Our latest invention is official fast-breaking parties.

You may consider all of this as using religion as a political tool. This opinion may be valid for the corrupt small-town politician, but it is misleading because it conceals the basic cause. Behind all of this token behavior, which may look like using religion for politics, lies an effort to pacify the mosque on the part of those who hold religion under governmental control.

Religious movements have accepted these concessions one by one, but were not the least bit distracted from their main goal. As is increasingly becoming clear, this fundamental goal is to capture the state which controls the religion, and thus to get rid of official oversight embodied in the Department of Religious Affairs. Demands for an Islamic state are the outward manifestation of this goal.

The troubles that we have experienced since the founding of the republic were suffered by the Christian world 900 years ago, in the 11th century. Then, the Catholic church was under the control of the feudal aristocracy. The 11th and even 12th centuries were periods of rebellion against the aristocracy; there was a fight for superiority between the Papacy and the

feudal aristocracy. At the end, the feudal aristocracy was obliged to recognize the independence of the Catholic church. It is this development which led to the Renaissance and the Reformation. The age of enlightenment rose up on the shoulders of a church liberated from the state.

The problem that the Christian world solved 900 years ago is now bothering the Islamic world. If the Islamic countries appear to be unstable nowadays, one of its reasons is the struggle for superiority between religion and the state.

If we want to escape from this instability we must complete the Ataturk Revolution which we believe to be only partial. A free mosque should be established as soon as possible in which the state does not interfere, which can solve its problems on its own, create its own hierarchy and secure its own financial resources. Within a legal framework which considers the use of religious force and the efforts to found a religious state illegal, the mosque must be given back to the mosque.

When the revolution of freedom of religion has been realized, we will have overcome the biggest obstacle to freedom of thought: fanaticism. This revolution is indispensable for the start of the age of enlightenment in Turkey.

12990/12948

CSO: 3554/159

## JUSTICE MINISTER LOOKS AT REFORM POSSIBILITIES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Nov 86 p 11

[Abbas Guclu interview with Justice Minister Mahmut Oltan Sungurlu]

[Text] Soon after the publication of our investigative report entitled The Justice System Is Collapsing, we had an interview with the new justice minister, Oltan Sungurlu. The new minister explained his outlook on the problems within the justice system and where he will begin his reform activities.

[Question] The view that "our justice system is fast collapsing" is spreading fast in public opinion. Do you share these views?

[Answer] What do we say? There is congestion in the justice system. Why? There are too many cases. The number of cases per judge is far above the capacity of one man. For too high. This being the situation, the judge finds himself--with reason--unable to tackle the task. We have positions for close to 8,000 judges and prosecutors. But one in four is unfilled. Why? Because we advertise for applicants and nobody applies.

[Question] Is it not necessary to make the posts of judge and prosecutor more attractive?

[Answer] Now, I say in my capacity as minister of justice that "the most important problem in the country is that of judges and prosecutors." The minister of education says: "It is the teacher who educates both the judge and the prosecutor. The most important problem is that of education and teaching." The minister of health chips in with "all these problems cannot be solved without people being in good health. The most important problem lies in the health system." And the view of the interior minister is that "if there is no security of life, what good is justice?".... We can go on and on like this.

[Question] Can we choose between these?

[Answer] The problem, from the viewpoint of the Turkish Republic, is what we are able to offer to members of various professions in the present range of earnings. Let us find the answer to this. But I am in a position to

say something different to my ministerial colleagues. "Let us admit for a moment that the judges have high salaries. But look: how many applications do I get for my job advertisements and how many do you receive for yours? There is a constant queue of applicants at your door. Everybody is a candidate. But at our doors, there is nobody." In other words, there is nobody to put up with this hardship for this kind of money. We must make a bit of an effort to see the matter this way.

[Question] If the applications are too few, how do you make a selection?

[Answer] Now, our task is to practice good law. But how are we to do it? With good staff, naturally. And how does one find good staff? First, by selecting well at the entry point into the profession. Do we get this opportunity? No. Or, let us say, we can train them on the job. Do we get the opportunity to do so? No. We might perhaps ensure that they work in comfort and tranquility in their profession. Do we have such an opportunity? No, once again. So, you can see clearly and explicitly where our crisis lies.

[Question] Where will you begin the reform in the justice system?

[Answer] Making the post of judge an attractive one is where the foundation of reforming the justice system begins. We cannot solve this problem without making the profession an attractive one. When I took over my post, the prime minister instructed us to conduct a study concerning new judges, prosecutors, and court secretaries. We did this immediately and passed it on to the Ministry of Finance. The prime minister has issued instructions to the Ministry of Finance as well. We are waiting for the Finance Ministry to conclude its studies. They say "we shall complete them soon." We have discussed the matter with the prime minister and he has said "we shall solve this problem by executive order in 1987." I pass on the prime minister's promise to you, and I accept it as very good news for my colleagues in the law profession.

[Question] Can the profession of judge or prosecutor be made attractive solely by increased salaries?

[Answer] We are giving priority to the salaries of judges and members of professions. One can take one's holiday where he chooses if he has the money. Now, it would be wrong to get bogged down in detail. Our ministry has two holiday sites. We are building two more. When we are attacking the main target, it would be wrong to waste time over details such as holidays and hostels.

[Question] Fine, where would you start?

[Answer] The essential problem is to improve the daily lives of judges and prosecutors. I have, since becoming minister of justice, considered and decided that there is a single issue involved in reforming the Justice Ministry. (1) to raise the salaries of judges and prosecutors; (2) to increase the number of staff and reduce the workload.

[Question] Is the shortage of judges and prosecutors the sole reason for the heavy workload?

[Answer] The first cause is the shortage in numbers. There are, of course, other reasons as well. Take bureaucracy for instance. Currently, you cannot even have fingerprints examined in the provinces. If a fingerprint on glass has to be examined, the glass is cut and sent to Ankara. This is because local investigation results yield wrong conclusions. We are now trying to develop forensic medicine.

[Question] As a minister who has come up through the legal profession, can you promise that "In no more than a few years, the courts will be able to set trial dates not in some 6 months but within 1, and that trials will not drag on for years?"

[Answer] It took more than a few years for the justice system to reach its present state. There is the legacy of years and years. This is why I am not saying that things will be put right quickly. The measures we take will reduce problems in the long run. The reason is that it will take 3 to 4 years for the new staff we will recruit to really get to work. In other words, it will take a little time to raise the overall quality.

[Question] The mention of quality immediately brings to mind the following question. One out of every three cases is annulled on appeal. This shakes citizens' confidence in the justice system. How do you view that?

[Answer] This is a delicate matter, as it concerns the internal affairs of the Court of Appeals. Therefore I do not wish to comment on it. But when a judge concludes over 2,000 cases a year, how perfect do you expect the results to be? The wonder is that the judge can hand down any judgments at all.

[Question] As a lawyer, you have witnessed how there is a different judge for different sessions in the same trial. How does this affect justice?

[Answer] It delays it, to say the least. It hampers releasing the accused on bail in criminal cases. Imagine a judge entering a case with, say, 70 people in the dock. He is compelled to say hello and goodbye. He has no way of knowing whom to set free. None of this is the judge's fault.

[Question] In penal cases, statements made to the police are often refuted when the matter comes up in court. Are you considering the setting up of a judicial police [adli zabita] system as in the West?

[Answer] I have not given thought to this subject yet. I do not want to talk about it without studying it first.

[Question] How will you end the practice of articulated apprenticeship as a form of unpaid labor? Is it possible that a "justice academy" may be set up?

[Answer] We have included the improvement of the conditions of articulated apprenticeship for lawyers and judges among our goals. We have not yet reached the stage of creating a justice academy.

[Question] Lawyers, judges, and prosecutors are complaining that laws are being changed too often. What is your comment on the attitude of "Let us pass this law now; if it does not work, we will change it"?

[Answer] I most certainly do not share this view. Congestion in the justice system is not due to imperfections in the law but due to lack of resources. We must rid ourselves of the habit of changing the laws every time we stumble over something.

[Question] Many establishments, including YöK [the Higher Education Council] have no compulsory retirement at the age of 65. How do you view the fact that judges and prosecutors, who are in short supply in our country, are subject to compulsory retirement at 65?

[Answer] I do not know the basis on which this limit has been set. But we must take account of the fact that some people over the age of 65 would have a hard time tackling a workload of 2,000 cases successfully.

[Question] The workload of the courts is further increased by a number of disputes that do not in fact require resorting to the courts, such as traffic offenses, rectification of the incorrectly registered age of persons, and probate. Your ministry began a study on this; what stage has this work reached?

[Answer] The study continues. I am for having each case enjoy the benefit of the supervision of a judge. It is true that very simple cases may be settled out of court. But would you have a press case of yours tried by a judge or by the Press Council or any other similar body?

[Question] Lawyers are unhappy that they are not allowed sufficient time to have their say at trials.

[Answer] They are justified in their complaints about being allowed insufficient time for defense. But what choice does a judge have in a court where hundreds of cases are tried in one day?

13184/12948

CSO: 3554/144

## EDITORIAL STRESSES VALUE OF SECULAR PRINCIPLES FOR DEMOCRACY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 86 pp 1, 11

[Editorial by Hasan Cemal: "Secularism, the Infrastructure of Democracy"]

[Text] There are people who, based on the all-inclusive and comprehensive nature of Islam, say and believe that "If you are Muslim, you must comply with all of Islam's requirements."

That may be so.

But it will not do to try to transform this kind of belief into the foundationstone of civil and social order, because, otherwise, there would be neither secularism nor democracy left to speak of.

You are entitled say your prayers the prescribed five times a day and to attend the Friday prayers. But if you attempt to close down places of work at prayer times and to compel everyone to go to the Friday prayers, as is the case in certain Arab countries, then you cannot talk either of human rights, secularism, or democracy.

You are entitled to fast as you wish during Ramadan; you may don the chador or wear a headscarf. But if you attempt to turn either practice into a compulsory social rule, then there is neither democracy left nor human rights.

If you choose to make religion the fountain of law, if you apply different and unequal legal provisions to people on the basis of their religion and sex, and if you base the source of legality in a country not on the sovereignty of the people but on religious canons and on God, then you cannot speak of either secularism or democracy.

You cannot talk of secularism and, in the same breath, of making religious instruction compulsory--they will not go together; if you say, "yes, they will," then you are not entitled to talk either about secularism, or the freedom of conscience, or human rights....

One can no doubt extend this list further. The more one does so and the deeper one looks into it minutely, the clearer it becomes that the

secularization of the civil and social order--particularly in a country like Turkey where almost the whole of the population is Muslim--is not quite as easy a task as may seem

Let us cast a glance on European history; let us remember the bloody sectarian fights, the religious wars; let us recall the clashes between church and state, the controversies between science and religion, and only then will we see what a painful process secularization proved to be in the West.

One may also read Umberto Eco's novel 'The Name of the Rose' to grasp how eerie the darkness of the Middle Ages was. One can also see in the same novel how some shafts of light did stab that darkness here and there. The transformation of the profound darkness of the Middle Ages into light, the emancipation of the human mind by casting aside dogma, and the democratization and secularization of social life did not prove easy, and they took a long time.

In our country, Ataturk became the initiator--in the most radical way--of this struggle that lasted several hundred years in Europe. The steps he took to end the "Middle Ages" and to transform darkness into light can comfortably be described as a "cultural revolution." He initiated a top-to-bottom fight against the mentality that destroyed the Ottoman state and social order and enslaved the human mind for centuries. He abolished Islamic rule in education and teaching, as well as in the legal system which regulates human relations. He adopted the premise that concepts and values connected with religion belong to the realm of conscience and that these may not play a regulatory role in determining human relations.

The second dimension of Ataturk's concept of secularism lies in ending the role of Islam in the institutionalization of political power and the regulation of the latter's legitimacy; it lies in his vision that the source of sovereignty rests in the nation absolutely and unconditionally; it lies in the rejection of the concept that legitimacy is based on religion, in establishing a secular republic by overthrowing the Sultanate, the abolition of the Caliphate, in purging the constitution of provisions contrary to secularism in 1928 and, in 1937, incorporating secularism as a characteristic of the republic.

Ataturk opened the road to the implementation of the secular state and social system, a process that took a whole era to materialize in the West, by means of a revolution from the top in a society which was conditioned and directed in accordance with Islam for hundreds of years and was almost entirely Muslim. It is because of these particularities that there have been certain differences--quite naturally--between Ataturk's implementation of secularism and the concept of secularism in republican Turkey on the one hand and, on the other, the separation of church and state in the West.

At this stage, it is necessary to emphasize one particular point. Secularism and the freedom of conscience are the backbone of Ataturk's



"cultural revolution." By making this principle the foundationstone of the republican regime, Ataturk at the same time established--in a sense--the infrastructure of democracy in our country. There is not a single other Islamic country that has gone through this process. This is why there is no Islamic country in the world today other than Turkey which enjoys democracy--incomplete and flawed though it may be.

This is how Ilber Ortayli, the esteemed political scientist and historian, touches upon how Ataturk's implementation of secularism created the infrastructure of democracy.

"In the context of historical evolution, social and economic development constitute the precondition for political modernization. This, however, is not enough. If we keep in mind that certain Middle Eastern countries (like Egypt and Iran), which embarked upon economic modernization at about the same time as Turkey, lag behind us in the development of political institutions and ideology and that they have yet to achieve a level of democracy comparable to Turkish democracy--whatever its faults--it becomes clear that the changing social structure of Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century has been influenced and guided by the secular reforms.

"Secular ideology has an important share in the development of political modernization in Turkey, in a manner similar to that in Western societies, and in the existence of a democratic social struggle. Numerous historical examples attest to the fact that an ideological change at a certain point in historical development can accelerate and give direction to structural changes. We see that secularism and the revolutions that constitute an integral whole with it created influences that accelerated sociopolitical change in Turkish society, which had been changing ever since the 19th century and was laboring with the pains of these changes." (Ilber Ortayli, "On Secular Movements in the Ottoman State; The Evolution of Turkish Political Life," page 169)

Through a secular state and social order, Ataturk laid the foundations of a brand new infrastructure on which democracy could be built. There have always been forces at home and abroad which could not accept this foundation and wanted to destroy it. Those who want to end the secular state regime by claiming that Islam is inclusive and comprehensive are constantly investing in another infrastructure. These forces do not care for democracy; "the rise of Islam" is their byword. They are being protected as "auxiliary support" by political administrations and parties that are not overly concerned with democracy. And they have a ready demagogic argument to intimidate those who are dedicated to the defense of the secular state and social structure as a basic requirement of democracy; they attack a person as not believing in democracy and for opposition to the freedom of conscience and worship. Enough said!

We would like to emphasize once again: secular social and civil order constitute the infrastructure of a pluralist democracy; they need to be strengthened. As in Western democracies, every trend in our country should

also be entitled--on condition that it repudiates violence--to organize itself politically. Nobody should have the right to meddle in anybody's belief, worship, faith or lack of it; nor should anybody be forced to have religious instruction; everybody should be allowed to express and discuss his thoughts and beliefs freely and without reservation. Like "freedom of conscience," all freedoms should be fully implemented in society.

In contrast, the principle of secularism should be strictly adhered to in state activities, in education and in teaching; the law on the unity of teaching should be implemented unreservedly. To develop and strengthen the secular social order, the state must scrupulously fulfill its duty, particularly in the field of national education. There is no other way to save ourselves from reaction, from "a return to the past," to neutralize those who long for the Middle ages, and to catch up with democracy and modernity.

What a pity, though, that political administrations which shy away from true democracy continue--now as ever--not to take the principle of secularism too seriously.

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## FINLAND-USSR TRADE COMMISSION CHIEF ON CLEARING ACCOUNT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Jan 87 p 29

[Article by Timo Repo, general secretary of the Finland-Soviet Union Economic Commission: The Payment Situation in Trade with the East Hampers Compensation Projects]

[Text] Timo Repo, general secretary of the Finland-USSR Economic Commission, pointed out that compensation projects cannot be implemented through a clearing account so long as the account balance shows a surplus in Finland's favor. Repo spoke on Wednesday at the commission's food products working group meeting in Espoo.

According to Repo, of the various types of compensation it is precisely clearing compensation that would be most suitable for the countries' bilateral trade.

The term "compensation project" in the vocabulary of trade with the East means that Finns build production facilities in the Soviet Union from which they later can import the products to Finland. The projects involve "compensation" in the sense that the import purchases compensate or reimburse the price of building the project wholly or partially.

In clearing compensation import purchases are handled as ordinary imports, which is also apparent in the clearing accounts. The facility is constructed with the customary conditions for a project export but at the same time it is agreed that the Finnish enterprise will begin purchases of the finished products from the facility when it is completed.

The clearing trade credit limit of 300 million rubles has now been exceeded by about 300 million rubles. The excess 300 million ruble Finnish credit balance has been shifted to a special interest-bearing account, which is to be paid by the end of 1991.

## Granting Credit Raises the Price

The main problem that has slowed the implementation of the project has been arranging the financing during the construction period. Full compensation is the opposite of clearing compensation; in it the facility to be delivered is financed completely by credit, and loan repayment through

commodity deliveries begins only when the factory has been completed. In partial compensation part of the price is paid for like any other project export through clearing, and part is paid later in goods from the factory that was built.

"Clearing trade is traditionally cash trade and is planned with this in mind. The creation of new imports is so important, however, that in Finland, as an exception, there is a readiness to promote compensation deals with lending too, even though delivery credits as such are a completely foreign element in clearing practice," Repo said.

In credit trade financing costs raise the price of the project, and the influence on the overall cost varies with the amortization period and the rate of interest.

"Hence financing costs must be estimated truthfully and the fact must be recognized that operations based on lending will be more expensive than the corresponding clearing delivery," Repo said.

According to Repo, compensation projects must not compete with present imports. The basic idea is namely to create through them permanent new imports from the Soviet Union.

Loans may be granted under export credit terms that are applicable in Finnish foreign trade. Correspondingly an unconditional requirement is that there be adequate demand for the products and that they do not compete with domestic production or exports. According to Repo the observance of the conditions is absolutely essential; otherwise the project is not creditworthy.

"Imports of products to Finland can also be initiated from other facilities even before the facility that is the object of the transaction is completed. Here it is a question of advance or accelerated compensation," Repo explained.

Repo considers advance compensation to be the best version of partial compensation in those circumstances in which the implementation time is short and in which credit costs can thus be minimized.

Repo voiced the opinion that full compensation projects would not be very attractive when high interest rates prevail. It is difficult to predict the price behavior of compensation products.

The model best suited for each project, according to Repo, must be assembled from a clearing share, a credit share and a commodity payment schedule including advance imports. At the same time one must consider the price of compensation products in relation to total costs.

If the price class is very low, the payback period from product imports will probably be lengthened excessively, and the product quantities may cause marketing difficulties. Repo estimated that if the payment period begins to approach 15-20 years--and such periods have been offered--the project hardly has a realistic basis any longer. According to him, an implementation period of 5 years, for example, would be considered already close to the maximum.

## ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE PUBLISHES STUDY ON USSR TRADE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Jan 87 p 24

[Unsigned article: Etla's Large Study on Soviet Trade Finished: the Price of Oil Will Fetter Trade With the East up to 1990]

[Text] The Economic Research Institute (Etla) estimates that Finland's exports to the Soviet Union will decline in the period 1986-90 as compared to 1985.

How rapidly exports will decline will depend above all on the price behavior of crude oil. According to Etla's "basic alternative" the volume of exports to the Soviet Union will decline by an average of 6.5 percent per year from 1986 to 1990. In the basic alternative the price per barrel of crude oil will be \$15 on the average up to 1990, rise to \$18 in 1989 and further to \$20 in 1988.

Etla's researchers assume that from 1988 to 1990 Finland will no longer be able to purchase oil for reexport from the Soviet Union. If reexportation is still practiced then too, exports to the East can rise higher.

Etla's study, "Trade with the Soviet Union in Finland's National Economy," is the first broad report on the topic. It outlines the history of trade with the East, its role in the national economy and from the standpoint of various sectors, its bilateral nature, various financing arrangements and prospects for the future.

The study, which was made public on Monday in Helsinki, was drafted by a working group that included Kari Alho, Osmo Forssell, Juhani Huttunen, Markku Kotilainen, Ilkka Luukkonen, Olli-Tapio Mattila, Jorma Moilanen and Pentti Vartia.

The study was financed by the Oljyalan keskusliitto [Central Association for the Oil Sector].

The prospects for trade between Finland and the Soviet Union are outlined right up to 1990. The background for the assessment was the new situation that arose last year: the collapse of the oil price at the beginning of 1986 and the credit balance created for Finland.

In addition to the basic alternative two other alternative scenarios for oil price developments, which regulate trade with the East, are presented in the study.

In the minimum alternative the price per barrel of oil falls below \$10 for almost the whole period of the forecast and the volume of exports falls 10 percent per year on the average.

In the maximum alternative crude oil becomes more expensive gradually, so that in 1990 it is already reaching \$30. If the price of oil moves in this manner, the volume of exports would probably decrease only 1 percent per year.

Etla emphasizes that the alternatives simply represent calculations; they give a general picture of the significance of the price of oil for trade with the East and the development of exports. In practice payment arrangements for the Soviet Union's debt will probably mean that an adjustment to the lower exports will be implemented already in the years 1986-88, and after that exports to the Soviet Union will again begin to grow.

#### The Volume of Imports Will Grow 6 Percent

The study group estimates that the volume of imports from the Soviet Union will grow by 6 percent on the average from 1986 to 1990. In addition, it is assumed that trade will be balanced at a value of 2.5 billion marks by means of oil for reexportation. The use of oil for reexportation has the same effect as if the Soviet Union paid its debt in convertible currency.

Energy will continue to predominate in Finland's imports from the Soviet Union in the near future, according to the Etla assessment. Although the price of oil will probably fall, the growth in the volume of other energy products will keep energy's share of the volume of commodity imports above 70 percent.

On the average 11.5 million tons of crude oil and petroleum products are imported from the Soviet Union. There are few possibilities for increasing these imports because, for one reason, imports of Soviet oil already exceed Finland's consumption for the near future. The share of machinery and equipment is predicted to exceed 10 percent of the value of imports, while it was only 4 percent in 1985. The rapid growth depends largely on the extent of industrial cooperation.

According to Etla estimates, export projects with investments that were carried out during the period of expensive oil were profitable from Finland's standpoint. The broad exports to the East have increased disposable income and have been economically advantageous.

Exports to the Soviet Union provided employment for 140,000 persons in the mid-1980's, while in the 1970's it had been only 50,000. Commodity exports to the Soviet Union provided employment for about 130,000, while construction projects and exports of other services provided employment for about 10,000 persons.

The employment effect of exports to the Soviet Union calculated on a per unit basis is a little larger than exports to the West. This derives from the fact that exports to the East are concentrated in labor-intensive sectors such as the metal industry and the textile, clothing, leather and shoe industry.

Exports to the Soviet Union and other exports at present give rise to approximately the same amount of import requirements, according to the study. Exports to the West, however, clearly give rise to more import requirements from the Soviet Union than exports to the Soviet Union do. This share is a fifth in exports to the Soviet Union, while in exports to the West it is no less than a quarter.

According to the report, the difference results from the fact that other exports are more energy-intensive and require more energy inputs than exports to the Soviet Union. In exports to the Soviet Union the metal industry has risen to become the largest generator of domestic income or net export income. In exports to the West it is still the forest products industry.

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## LOWER IMPORT PRICES SEEN MAIN FACTOR IN LARGE TRADE SURPLUS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Jan 87 p 28

[Article by Kristiina Ritvos: "Export Surplus Five Billion: Import Prices 10 Percent Lower Last year"]

[Text] Last year the Finns received 5 billion marks more money from exports than they had to pay for imported commodities.

The trade surplus results primarily from the low prices of import commodities, especially oil. The volume of imports increased 5.7 percent, but import prices fell 10.0 percent.

Expenditures for imports declined by 5 percent. The total value of imports was 77.6 billion marks. Finland's receipts from exports fell by 2 percent from 1985. The value of exports has now reached 82.6 billion.

The values of exports and imports are generated as a result of the quantities of commodities sold and bought and their prices. Last year's drop in the values of exports and imports resulted from the prices. The fact is that 0.6 percent more commodities were exported in 1986 than in 1985, but export prices declined by 2.3 percent on the average.

The main change in foreign trade last year was the reduction in the value of crude oil imports by a half, which resulted solely from the price. Both crude oil and the dollar, which is used in calculating its value, weakened markedly in 1986.

"While the average price was about 1,250 marks per ton all the previous year, crude oil cost less than 620 marks on the average last year," Jorma Uitto, general director of the Customs Administration, said on Tuesday in Helsinki.

The value of energy imports fell almost 40 percent, and its share in total imports was reduced to 15 percent from the previous year's 24 percent.

The terms of trade as expressed in the unit value index improved by just under 9 percent. Last year the index was 111, while the previous year it had been 102. Terms of trade means the level of export prices compared to the level of import prices.



In the first half of the year 10 percent fewer export marks accumulated than in the same period in 1985. In the latter half on the other hand the value of exports was almost 7 percent larger than in the months July to December 1985.

The value of exports to the Soviet Union declined by 7 percent from the previous year. Exports to the whole socialist camp fell by 8 percent. Exports to the West remained at the same level.

The best growth sector was the ceramic, glass and stone processing industry, the value of exports of which grew 14 percent.

Total metal exports increased by 4 percent in value. Their share rose to 38.6 percent of total exports--above the share of the forest products industry, which was 38.2 percent.

The greatest growth in metal was the metal products and machine-building industry in which the value of exports increased 7 percent thanks to good prices alone.

Sales of basic metals grew 5 percent, but because of low prices they yielded receipts that were 8 percent less than in the previous year. In 1986 prices were 12 percent lower on the average than in 1985.

Forest product exports grew in volume terms but remained about the same in terms of value.

The value of chemical exports declined about a fifth because of the oil price. Receipts from petroleum products declined 40 percent. Fertilizer exports declined 7 percent.

Foreign sales from the food, beverage and tobacco industry declined in value by a fifth.

Dairy product exports dropped by a fifth, and meat exports by two-fifths. Receipts from grain sales fell by a third, furs by 10 percent and timber by a half.

Clothing exports increased in value by 3 percent.

The value of exports to developing countries decreased 15 percent, because sales to OPEC countries declined by a third.

The EC's share of exports was 38 percent, EFTA's 22, CEMA's 22, developing countries' 7 and that of other countries 11 percent.

The share of the Soviet Union dropped to about 20 percent, but the country remained at the head of the export countries in front of Sweden, whose share was 15 percent. England was third with 11 percent and West Germany fourth with 10 percent.

## Crude Oil Imports 9.9 Million Tons


Crude oil imports amounted to 9.9 million tons. The value of imports rose by 1 percent over the previous year. The volume of crude oil and petroleum products grew just under 4 percent, but prices fell 14 percent. The Soviet Union's share in crude oil imports was 86 percent, Saudi Arabia's 10 percent, England's and Iran's 2 percent and Norway's 1 percent.

Oil's share of energy was 70 percent, that of coal and coke 16, natural gas five, electricity also 5 and nuclear power 4 percent.

Because of oil the share of raw materials and production inputs fell four percentage points to 58.5 percent.

The value of imports of investment goods grew by a tenth, but the volume of imports grew by only 5 percent.

Imports of consumer goods grew 16 percent but the volume of goods by only 10 percent. The strongest was the growth in imports of passenger cars, which increased by 26 percent. Last year 140,000 passenger cars were imported or 14,000 more than in 1985. Japan's share of the market was just under 39 percent, West Germany's 29, Belgium's 7, Sweden's and France's 6, the Soviet Union's 5 and Italy's 4 percent.



### Key:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Imports and exports by commodity groups in 1986 | 9. Agricultural and forestry                   |
| 2. Imports by use of commodities                   | 10. Textile and clothing industry              |
| 3. Raw materials and production inputs             | 11. Lumber industry                            |
| 4. (Crude oil)                                     | 12. Paper industry                             |
| 5. Fuels   | 13. Chemical industry                          |
| 6. Investment goods                                | 14. Basic metal industry                       |
| 7. Consumer goods                                  | 15. Metalworking and machine-building industry |
| 8. Exports by economic sectors                     | 16. Other sectors                              |

## Balance of Payments Deficit Reduced by Half a Billion Marks

The balance of payments deficit became a 0.5 million marks smaller last year. The deficit amounted to 4.2 billion marks last year or 1.2 percent of the gross national product.

In addition to commodity trade the balance of payments includes capital movements such as foreign debt and services, for example travel.

From capital flows and services a combined deficit of 9 billion marks accumulated. The final amount of the balance of trade is arrived at by adding the positive balance of about 5 billion marks from commodity trade to the negative balance of 9 billion marks [for capital movements and services].

The net amount of interest payments on foreign debt was 7 billion marks. Gross interest payments were 13.5 billion marks, but on the credit side 6.5 billion marks in interest income were received.

Finland has a net foreign debt of 51.4 billion marks or 14 percent of the gross national product. The long-term net debt was 61.4 billion marks, and the short-term net credit was 10.0 billion marks. The net government debt was 24.4 billion marks.

The balance of payments deficit grew on the side of convertible currencies. On the other hand the balance of payments for non-convertible currencies was clearly in surplus.

According to a survey by the Bank of Finland the net import of long-term capital was 4.2 billion marks, and the net export of short-term capital was 7.9 billion marks.

Because of the deficit in the balance of payments and the net export of capital foreign currency reserves declined by 7.9 billion marks in 1986. The reserves of convertible currencies declined by 11.7 billion marks, and the reserves of non-convertible currencies grew by 3.7 billion marks. At the end of the year the convertible reserve was 10.6 billion marks, and the non-convertible reserve was 3.4 billion marks.

The surplus in the balance of trade was 4.6 billion marks according to Bank of Finland statistics. The difference from the data published by the Customs Administration results from the fact that the Bank of Finland takes into account corrections resulting from the payments balance.

According to the Bank of Finland's calculations the surplus in trade with the East was 4.3 billion marks and in trade with the West 0.3 billion marks. In the previous year the balance of trade surplus as calculated by the Central Bank was 1.7 billion marks.

The balance of services was in equilibrium, while in the previous year it had still shown a surplus of 1.3 billion marks. The transportation balance of 2.9 billion marks was a third smaller than in the previous year.

Travel revenues fell by 3 percent, and travel expenditures grew by 9 percent. The travel balance deficit rose to 2.4 billion marks, while it had been 1.8 billion marks a year earlier.

The deficit in the balance for other services was 0.5 billion marks.

The deficit in the balance for returns on capital was 0.7 billion marks larger than a year earlier. The deficit for the transfer payments balance was 1.5 billion marks.

New drawings of long-term foreign debt amounted to 19.3 billion marks and amortizations to 13.9 billion marks. The net import of capital was thus 5.4 billion marks.

New drawings of long-term government credits exceeded amortization by 0.1 billion marks. Conversions of short-term credits to long-term credits by the foreign exchange banks raised the net loan capital imports of the financial institutions to 6.6 billion marks. Net exports of loan capital by enterprises were 1.1 billion marks.

Portfolio investment in Finland as a net amount was 0.6 billion marks.

#### A Favorable Period for Exports

Finnish foreign trade managed to survive last year's vicissitudes rather commendably, although bad expectations were expressed in mid-year. The collapse in the price of oil actually was manifested as a shrinkage in trade with the Soviet Union. On the other hand exports to the West were stronger than expected towards the end of the year.


Thus last year's export figures remained pretty well on the previous year's level. It is a historical fact that when prices fell incomes from exports were a few percent less than in the previous year. In volume terms, however, exports still managed a growth of 1 percent.

In addition last year's import figures were below the previous year's by about 5 percent. Nevertheless, a greater quantity of goods came into the country for this amount of money.

What is economically gratifying is that receipts from exports were five billion marks more than what imports cost. Even if this is not quite as much as was expected, it was still twice as large as last year's surplus.

#### A Mirror Image of the Previous Year

As a whole last year was a mirror image of the previous year. Exports were deplorable at the beginning of the year and good at the end of the year, trade with the East ran out suddenly, but trade with the West speeded up.



Key:

- |                                       |            |
|---------------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Foreign trade                      | 3. Exports |
| 2. Million marks, seasonally adjusted | 4. Imports |

The pull for exports to the West came almost solely from Europe. Outside it, among other places in the United States and the OPEC countries, Finnish goods were not sold in nearly the same quantity as a year earlier. The impoverishment of oil exporters was manifested clearly in Finnish sawn goods sales.

A reversal also occurred in exports when metal exports rose to be slightly larger than the second largest or forest products industry exports. Nevertheless, the forest products industry is the sector on the strength of which exports grew most strongly at the end of the year and is expected to shine in future export performance.

The forest products industry exports in volume terms ended up being a little better than expected by reaching a growth of 2 percent last year. The price hopes, however, were somewhat disappointed. Thus receipts from paper industry exports remained lower than a year earlier.

This year the forest products industry is expecting improving prospects and a growth in receipts from exports. Nevertheless, no substantial increase in prices is anticipated.

#### Metal Expectations Unencouraging

The metal industry, which has climbed up to become the largest export industry, also speeded up at the end of last year, among other things because of ship deliveries to the Soviet Union. Metal's own expectations, however, are still rather gray, and metal exports are not expected to grow in the beginning of the year, although there are signs of a recovery in investment in both the purchasing countries and in Finland itself.

The weak results of the chemical industry last year can be attributed to the oil price collapse and the shutdown of the Neste refinery. On the other hand, the modest growth in exports of consumer goods has to be a disappointment, especially since imports in these sectors are expanding strongly.

The weakness in imports last year resulted almost solely from oil. Both investment and consumption goods were bought in larger quantities. The former indicated sufficient renewing of the productive equipment for the national economy. The latter manifested only the prosperity of the people.

This year's foreign trade is expected to proceed on the same pattern as last year despite the fact that exports to the Soviet Union may fall by a fifth.

This export gap is expected to be compensated for, however, by Western purchases. Thus trade with the West this year is predicted to exceed at least the 5 percent growth that the OECD countries are expecting in their trade with one another.

There are grounds for better growth, because last year's export development was curtailed by several temporary factors, among other things the collapse of petroleum product exports and the adjustment by the OPEC countries to reduced oil revenues.

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## POLL FINDS FINNS CONCERNED WITH WAGES GAP, UNEMPLOYMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Jan 87 p 13

[Unsigned article: "EVA Public Opinion Survey: Finland Is a Good Country but Income Distribution and Unemployment Cause Discontent"]

[Text] Most Finns consider their country a veritable paradise. Finland is a developed, prosperous safe country in which human freedom is generally protected. On the other hand every other citizen is dissatisfied with the distribution of incomes.

Not quite half of the Finns feel that the threat of violence and terrorism is also a problem for Finnish society.

Although material prosperity is at its peak, the state of happiness is disturbed by the scant opportunities for the individual to exert an influence and by unemployment.

The data appear from the report on Finnish attitudes, "Open and Closed Finland," which was made public by the Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta (EVA) [Industry and Trade Commission]. EVA's study is based on the responses of 2,500 Finns last fall to postal questionnaires.

The latest public opinion report is a continuation of a study of attitudes that appeared 2 years ago.

Eighty-seven percent of the respondents consider it is a joy and a privilege to be a Finn. Happiness is so blissful that no outsider can be accommodated in it. Only every fifth person believes that "the increasing employment of foreigners brings our country beneficial international influences."

According to the report Finns have a strong desire to isolate themselves from the outside world. The attitude of men to internationalization is more negative than that of women. The negative feeling increases in proportion to age and decreases as the educational level rises. Among the political groups the most positive stand on internationalization was taken by supporters of the Greens, the Democratic Alternative [left-wing communist faction] and the Swedish People's Party.

## The Banks Have Too Much Power

Every other Finn thinks that development assistance should not be increased so long as there are people needing assistance in Finland. Three-fourths of the Finns demanded the protection of the distinctiveness of our culture from the stranglehold of international culture.

No less than half of the respondents view the concentration of ownership with concern. In their opinion, especially the power of the banks, media and large enterprises has grown too much in Finland in recent years. The citizens are most generally satisfied with the power of the defense forces and the president of the republic.

EVA finds, in regard to attitudes, that new social disputes have taken the place of the traditional ones. Most of the respondents consider the conflict between enterprises and the protection of the environment to be one of the strongest ones. This opinion is shared by both women and men, young people and pensioners, regardless of professional affiliation. More opponents of nuclear power are found than previously.

Opposition to politics and a strong mistrust of the effectiveness of the party system still persists among the people. Finns are considered to be active participants in civic matters. EVA reveals something quite different: fully 46 percent of the 15-70 year old citizens do not participate in any association or organizational activity.

EVA explodes other myths. According to the report the general notion of the political alienation of young people is not correct nor is that of young people's bleak view of the world. On the other hand every other Finn is worried about the development of population in our country.

Seventy-seven percent of those interviewed believe that all of society would benefit if there were a more positive attitude towards enterprise in the country. Seventy percent of the men believe in a positive computer revolution. Fifty-six percent of the women want to believe that computers bring more benefit than harm.

According to the EVA report, people in Finland are fed up with the discussion about sexual equality. Attitudes towards the noble causes are more positive than before. One's own standard of living may be allowed to fall if guarantees are obtained that this would help reduce environmental and pollution problems.

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CSO: 3617/56



## REVIEW OF 1986 COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS, WAGE INCREASES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 p 11

[Text] Ankara (Cumhuriyet Bureau)--During 1986, various trade unions belonging to TURK-IS [Turkish Confederation of Labor] signed collective contracts for 426,150 workers employed in the state sector, and received an average of 30 percent wage increases. Contract negotiations covering 80,000 workers ended in disagreement in 1986. Various union officials complained about the state employer unions, saying: "No matter what we do, the representatives of these unions never agree to raises above 25-30 percent." The best collective contract in 1986, which resulted in a 35 percent-plus-10,000 [Turkish Liras] increase was signed by the Textile Employers Union and TEKSIF [Federation of Turkish Textile, Weaving and Wearing Apparel Industry Workers Unions] for its nearly 100,000 members.

The break-down of the number of workers covered and the percentage of wage increases achieved by collective contracts signed during 1986 by various trade unions belonging to TURK-IS are as follows:

Tezkoop-Is [expansion unknown]: Signed a collective contract for 15,000 workers employed in 72 workplaces. As a result, it received increases of 30 percent for the first year and 23 percent for the second year. The union received 27 percent plus 3,000 for 1985, 25 percent plus 2,500 for 1986 and 23 percent for 1987.

Yol-Is [Turkish State Highway Workers Federation]: Signed a collective contract for 7,000 workers at Alacam Village Services and received a 30-percent increase from the employer. YOL-IS will go to the negotiation table in 1987 for 45,000 workers at Turkish Highways and 55,000 working at various workplaces belonging to the Village Services Directorate General.

Turkiye Maden-Is [Turkish Mine, Metal, Metal Works and Machine Industry Workers Union]: Signed a collective contract for a total of 34,650 workers during 1986 and received an average of 30-percent wage increase.

TEKSIF: Signed an agreement for 160,000 and received an average of 30-40 percent wage increase in 1986. The contract TEKSIF signed with the Textile Employers Union for 100,000 workers, achieved 35-percent-plus-10,000 wage increase.

Petrol-Is [Turkish Petroleum Chemical, Nitrogen and Atomic Workers Union]: Did not sign any agreement with the public sector during 1986. The collective contract negotiations that Petrol-Is started with the Petro-Chemical Corporation for a total of approximately 8,000 workers are expected to end in disagreement.

Basisen [a union of bank and insurance workers]: Signed agreements for a total of 30,000 workers. The agreements provided a 45-percent increase for the first year and a 30-percent increase for the second year.

Turk-Metal [Federation of Turkish Metal Workers Unions]: Signed a contract covering 5,000 workers in 24 workplaces. It received an average of 35-40 percent increase for the first and second years.

Saglik-Is [Turkish Health Workers Union]: Signed a contract covering 12,000 workers. The contract provided 28 percent plus 2,500 for the first year and 23 percent for the second year. The negotiations with the Ministry of Health for 2,700 workers employed there are not expected to reach agreement.

Genel Maden-Is [General Mine Workers Union]: Signed a contract for 7,000 workers at Zonguldak workplace and received 37 percent for the first year and 23 percent for the second year.

Belediye-Is [Municipal Workers Union]: Signed a contract covering 80,000 workers and received 30-35 percent for the first year and 25-40 percent for second year.

Other contracts signed provided an average of 30 percent for 620 workers of the Turkish Agricultural Credit Cooperative Employees Union; 5,300 of the Turkish Civil Aviation Workers Union; 46,000 of Genel Maden-Is and 10,500 of the Turkish Cellulose and Cellulose Products Workers Union. Meanwhile, Turkish Mine Workers Union negotiations with the Turkish Coal Works Directorate General for its 35,000 members are expected to end in disagreement.

#### Negotiations in Progress

Collective contract negotiations between Agac-Is [Turkish Wood Industry Workers Union] and the Forest Products Industry Corporation Directorate General covering 4,000 workers at 24 workplaces are still continuing. The Turkish Journalists and Press Industry Workers Union is continuing its negotiations for around 1,300 workers employed at various workplaces. Also, negotiations by Tezkoop-Is covering 8,000 at 39 workplaces, by the Farm and Agricultural Industry Workers Union for 10,000 workers at the Soil Affairs Directorate General, by TEKSIF's 30,000 members working at Sumer Bank and by Turk-Metal for its 36,583 members working at various workplaces are still continuing.

#### Unions Complain about State Employers Unions

The presidents and other officers of various unions belonging to TURK-IS complained that the State Employer Unions [Kamu-Is] are being too inflexible at

the negotiation table. Agac-Is President Gurel Ercakir said that he will go into negotiations for 300 workers employed by SEKA [Turkish Cellulose and Paper Factories Administration] and added: "Their approach is really inflexible, and they never compromise. I will not compromise either, we will never surrender. As they do not have the initiative, they cannot move beyond a specific limit, then we will go on strike."

BASS [Bank and Insurance Workers Union] President Raci Bayulke said that they will go to the negotiation table with TUHIS [expansion unknown] and Kamu-Is and added: "We have never sat at the same table yet. We just became the bargaining agent at the Ziraat Bank. We do not know their attitude yet. I think we will meet in 15-20 days."

An officer of TEKSIF said that they applied to the directorate general to start negotiations for the workers employed in various workplaces belonging to the Turkish Mohair and Wool Directorate General and added: "They said that Kamu-Is has jurisdiction on this subject. We held negotiations with Kamu-Is. Kamu-Is said that they wanted the collective contract signed for Sumer Bank to be applied to workers employed there. We presented to Kamu-Is a copy of the contract we had signed with Sumer Bank. They rejected it. We took the case to arbitration and still could not get a result. Finally, we went on strike. We disagree on administrative matters, even before taking up the monetary points. These are all aggressive and non-constructive people; they should be flexible."

Basin-Is President Ali Ekber Guvenc asserted that Kamu-Is just carries out the instructions of Prime Minister Ozal and added: "These unions can not break the rules set by the Economic Coordination Council. Their argument is that administrative matters should be discussed first before going into the monetary subjects. For example, they refuse to accept worker participation in management decisions. Then the contract goes to the SAC [Supreme Arbitration Council]. They work together with these unions anyhow. In the end they always get what they want."

Saglik-Is President Mustafa Basoglu said that they had opposed the establishment of Kamu-Is in the first place and added: "The establishment of these unions is unconstitutional." He summarized his views as follows: "These unions function as state organizations, and as such, they are not independent. They do not have the right to make final decisions. They have to get authorization from their ministries before they decide. This behavior has negative effects on the negotiations. Also, these unions retract workers' rights. The fact that they are members of the Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions is another problem. The state joins forces with the private sector trying to give as few rights as possible to their workers. This phenomenon violates the Unions Law."

Stating that the collective contracts signed with the private sector were much better than those signed with the public sector, Basoglu said, "We are getting 30-35 percent wage increases from the private sector; these, however, never allow anything above 25 percent." Basoglu said that they went to the negotiation table for around 10,000 workers in the Social Insurance Organization and could not reach agreement. When asked, "Did you go to the SAC?" he answered, "In principle there is no difference between Kamu-Is and the SAC. If we went there, we would get the same results. Thus, we did not go there."

## MERSIN FREE ZONE OPENS, STRIKES PROHIBITED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 p 10

[Article by Ufuk Tekin: "First Free Zone Opens"]

[Text] Aiming to reduce the costs of imports while increasing the volume of exports by taking a share of free zone trading, which makes up 10 percent of total world trade, Turkey will open its first free economic zone in Mersin this Saturday.

In principle, 208 companies are about to get licenses to operate in seven different categories of activities in the Mersin Free Zone. The zone is built on 763 donums [approximately 190 acres] of land and will be run by MESBAS (Mersin Free Zone Management, Inc.). The zone, which will be opened tomorrow by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, is sufficiently equipped with "barbed wire, entry gates with observation posts and additional administration buildings" to be officially inaugurated. While STFA (Sezai Turkes/Fevzi Akkaya Company), one of the companies contracted to build the infrastructure of the zone has completed its part, Kiska Company, responsible for road building, drinking water systems, sewer and electrical systems, will complete some of its work after the zone starts operating.

SPO [State Planning Organization] experts indicated that the Zone will add \$1.5 billion to exports and is expected to reduce the costs of imports. The SPO deputy director of the Mersin Free Zone, Huseyin Demircioglu, stated that, based on their own figures, the companies which are about to receive their licenses were anticipating exports of approximately \$1.5 billion from the zone.

MESBAS officials said that to date, out of the 208 firms which must get their licenses in principle, 98 had signed contracts as companies. Stating that there will be 115 lots on the 190 acres and seven basic categories of activities--production, assembly and packaging, renting, repair and maintenance, trading, services and storage--the officials added that, based on applications received, companies would provide 8,210 job opportunities.

#### Strikes, Lockouts Prohibited for 10 Years

Free Zone Directive No 18896, which passed on 12 September 1985, provides for the people working in the free zone to be subject to the social security laws of the Turkish Republic; however, Free Zone Series No 3218 prohibits strikes and lockouts for 10 years.

According to the relevant provision of the law, which led to interpretations that "free zones will employ cheap labor," the strike, lockout and arbitration provisions of Law No 2822 will not be applied in the zone for 10 years. During this period, all conflicts in collective labor contracts will be settled by the Supreme Arbitration Council.

eanwhile, although it is envisaged that all payments in free zones be made in 16 varieties of convertible foreign exchange, the article which states, "If the Council of Ministers so desires, it can decide to make payments in Turkish Liras," is interpreted as another way to employ cheap labor.

Meanwhile, even though all kinds of activities conducted in the zone were to be exempt from taxes, a fund established with the name "Help Fund for Developing and Supporting the Free Zone" which requires entry and departure deductions of from five one-thousandths to a total of 1 percent, has become another subject of criticism.

Commenting on the fund deduction, which could render exports more difficult and imports more expensive, Mersin Free Zone Deputy Director Huseyin Demircioglu said: "A one-percent fund deduction is not a large amount. Besides, such funds exist all over the world. For example, I know for fact that Egypt has an entry fee and university support funds, and they are in the 2-3 percent range."

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CSO: 3554/158

## ALTERNATIVE SERVICE ACCEPTANCE EASED: APPLICATIONS INCREASE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "Many Changes; Little Effect--The Right To Conscientious Objection and the Position of the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Bonn, March--"The problem of conscientious objection is increasing in alarming proportions. Adverse effects on the Bundeswehr are becoming apparent. The backlog of conscripts who have completed an application is about 80,000. Applications of conscientious objectors are increasing. In 1981 they increased to almost 60,000. Adding to the problem is the fact that the number of potential draftees will decrease rapidly in the future. In a comparable situation, the Federal Constitutional Court in April 1978 perceived a threat to defense capability. Consequently, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Bundeswehr." So stated Alfred Biehle, chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, on 25 January 1982 over 5 years ago.

What has happened since then to change a situation judged to be critical? When the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition assumed power in October 1982, it took immediate steps to amend the law which had precipitated the problems that led to Biehle's complaints. The revision included two significant amendments: "The test of conscience" was abolished and the period of alternative civilian service was extended. Since then anyone who does not want to become a soldier no longer needs to justify his request at a hearing but may submit a written application citing conscience as the reason for his refusal to serve. "Proof" is no longer required; a willingness to render civilian service for 5 more months than required by basic compulsory military service is all the law requires to substantiate reasons of conscience. The decision whether to render military or civilian service is now made by the affected individual himself and not by the state.

The procedure was not the only thing changed; the civilian service was also expanded. In 1982, when the administration changed, there were 50,959 slots for civilian service. Their number increased to 80,000 by the end of 1986 to accommodate the large number of draftees opting for alternative service. When the law took effect on 1 January 1984 the so-called "backlog of applicants" exceeded 100,000. Moreover, the number of new applications increased to more than 58,000 in 1982 and in 1983--in anticipation of the amended law and the corresponding extension of civilian service--there were 66,616. The number of

applications dropped to 44,014 in 1984 but has since risen continuously. With barely 59,000 applications in 1986, the level of 1982, which gave rise to Biehle's warning, was reached again. However, the expansion of civilian service slots--which cost the state more than DM1 billion annually--made it possible to accept a considerable number of applicants for civilian service. Of the more than 100,000 applicants affected by the "backlog" since the new law became effective in 1984, 56,432 have completed 16 months of civilian service as stipulated by the old law. An additional 65,885 have served, or are serving, 20 months in accordance with the new law. Counting all applicants, one sees that almost every other applicant was called to perform alternative civilian service. This is an improvement compared to the earlier situation. The trend nevertheless indicates that the amended law has not lowered the number of applicants for alternative service.

There are several reasons for this. Anyone who is serious about obeying his conscience will do so under any circumstances. A look at the past reveals other important reasons. Until 1968--the year of student protests and street battles by the extraparliamentary opposition--the number of applications for alternative service ranged from 2,000 to 6,000. Then it rapidly increased to 14,000, 19,000, 27,000 and 35,000. This suggests the presence of political motivations. There are also reasons of convenience which are not offset by the 5-month extension of civilian service initiated in 1984. That civilian service would still remain attractive was already indicated by a 1978 INFAS [Institute for Applied Social Science] study. From the point of view of those affected, the following factors are relevant: Someone who renders civilian service is not quartered in barracks but can generally sleep at home and can perform his duties in his hometown or its immediate vicinity. This keeps him from being separated from familiar surroundings, which the majority of recruits perceive to be the most significant concomitant circumstance of their service in the Bundeswehr. Besides, those eating at home enjoy the advantage of being paid a subsistence allowance in cash. The amount is DM10.00 per day which, at the end of the month, adds up roughly to a DM300.00 increase in pay which is based on the military pay scale. Those who eat in the garrison must forego this advantage.

The fact that working time in civilian service is contractually fixed, as distinct from the Bundeswehr, is equally important for many. Someone who, for instance, serves in a hospital or cares for the sick, works 40 hours a week; if alternative service consists of being a janitor or ambulance driver, the customary 56-hour week, which includes time on call, must be accepted. He is thereby assured free weekends, regular evening leisure time and vacation time. Alternative service for a young man thus represents an interruption, albeit relatively badly paid, of his normal professional career which on the whole does not interfere with his normal living conditions, interests or personal needs.

Because the new law leaves the decision which service to perform to the individual--as distinct from the previous condition when the state decided on "acceptance"--a qualitatively different situation has evolved. This applies not only to considerations of convenience but also to those of accountability. In the past a draftee could plead, even to himself, that he followed an "imperative" for which the state was responsible. Draftees which become

soldiers today know that this was ultimately the result of their own free choice. This may be relatively unimportant as long as an armed conflict is not even considered to be a real possibility. An armed conflict--which means having to fight, having to accept the risk of being killed or of having to kill--not only constitutes a risk to life and limb but also raises the problem of potential moral guilt. If the legislative organ now holds that military and civilian service must be regarded as being equally valuable, and in fact allows a free choice between the two, one can hardly blame anyone for availing himself of this opportunity. It is really remarkable that last year only 12.7 percent of those subject to the draft have registered for alternative service.

The problematic nature of an individual's fundamental right to act according to his conscience would really become apparent only if a majority, and not just a minority, availed itself of the right to alternative service. The individual could hardly be blamed. Anyone who expects greater concern for the common good--in this case the ability of the Federal Republic to defend itself--from a draftee than from those who have been elected and called upon to protect the common good--namely the Bundestag and the government--is turning things upside down.

The situation is no better today than it was 4 years ago when Biehle described it as perilous; it has, in fact, become even more dangerous. The plans for maintaining the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr are also based on the assumption that no more than 10 percent of those subject to the draft will opt for alternative service. This limit has clearly been exceeded and the trend suggests further increases. This situation is indicative of the problems created by a policy which places individual rights above those urgent needs that are inevitably associated with governing the commonweal.

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## WEAPONS TRAFFIC BETWEEN TURKEY, FRANCE CALLED 'SUSPICIOUS'

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Feb 87 pp 24-25

[Text] A very strange, if not suspicious, airlift between Turkey and France has been in operation in recent days. This bridge consists of Turkish C-130 and "Transall" transport jets, which, according to confirmed reports, are carrying military materiel and spare parts. Despite persistent journalistic efforts, it has proved impossible to locate the final destination of this materiel. As a result, many questions remain about the airlifts purpose.

According to NEA's exclusive information, 15 Turkish transports have landed at the French airports of Chateauroux and Rennes in the last month. There were 10 aircraft that reached Chateauroux in groups of three and four, and after staying there for 1-3 days, they took off for an unknown destination. The Chateauroux airport is located 250 km southwest of Paris and is considered a center for the shipment of "sensitive" French material abroad. Right next to it is a plant belonging to Aerospatiale, the French company that among other things manufactures the Exocet missiles the Iraqis use in the Persian Gulf war. The Rennes airport is located west of Paris.

## 'Ignorance'

The questions from the statements of "ignorance" about the reason of the presence of Turkish transports on French soil made by both Aerospatiale and the French Defense Ministry. On the other hand, no major French-Turkish agreement has been announced that could justify the presence of 15 huge Turkish transports at Chateauroux and Rennes. What, then, were the Turkish aircraft doing there?

According to a well-informed source at Chateauroux, they took on "military materiel and spare parts" manufactured by Aerospatiale. Nevertheless, despite the revitalizing French-Turkish relations, the extent of equipping of the Turkish Armed Forces with French-manufactured equipment is still so limited that it cannot justify the quantities of materiel that 10 C-130 transports can carry. At this point there is a very suspicious coincidence: three Turkish transports (two C-130's and one "Transall") stopped at Chateauroux on 20, 21 and 22 January. On the same dates, in the airport warehouses there was a shipment of crates from Aerospatiale destined for Iraq, not Turkey. In addition, no cargo arrived at the airport while the aircraft remained there.

Consequently, the Turkish transports were either at Chateauroux in transit or else they took on materiel for Iraq at night. It should be noted that during the day the aircraft remained in an out-of-the-way corner of the airport and that security vehicles were constantly patrolling near them.

In addition, according to reliable sources, at the beginning of February five Turkish transports at the Rennes airport took on antiaircraft weapons and low-altitude radar, with Iraq as their probable destination.

The affair of transporting materiel to Iraq by Turkish aircraft has been confirmed by a well-informed source, who said that "the aircraft are taking on materiel in both Belgium and France that is probably destined for the Iraqi Armed Forces."

Despite all that has been written over time about Turkey's claims on the northern part of Iraq, today Ankara has every reason to help Baghdad. The Iraqis are now facing the biggest--and probably decisive--Iranian offensive, and if Saddam Husayn should fall, the spread of Islamic radicalism would have unforeseeable consequences for Turkey. Therefore, it is not to be excluded, that the Turkish Air Force has undertaken to transport materiel and spare parts for Iraq, thus making it possible for the Iraqi Air Force to use all its transports at the front. In this way Ankara can also pay off the "promissory note" it signed in Baghdad last year in return for the agreement to allow Turkey to send troops into Iraqi territory to wipe out the Kurdish rebels.

#### 'Bombs'

According to other information obtained by NEA, France recently sold Turkey a large number of "Durandal" bombs, which are intended for use in destroying runways. In addition, the Thomson company has concluded an agreement with Ankara for the modernization of the radar system for Turkish Civil Aviation. This radar can certainly be used for military purposes as well.

At the same time, negotiations are continuing for the purchase by Turkey of a number of "Mirage 2000" aircraft (approximately 30). These negotiations began last spring, after the visit to Ankara of French Defense Minister Giraud. With this visit Mr. Chirac gave the "green light" for the rekindling of French-Turkish relations. Last July a squadron of French Mirage 2000's put on an aerial show at Turkey's Murtek airfield, and 2 months ago a delegation from Dassault visited Ankara. But the talks it conducted with Turkish officials led nowhere, and one reason was that the latter wanted to learn details about the...Greek-French agreement on Mirages.

#### Missiles

Furthermore, Turkey recently bought seven Airbus airliners from France with an option for four more. It also bought 1,000 Milan antitank missiles, and is negotiating with Aerospatiale for the purchase of "search and rescue" helicopters.

All these orders, however, either have already been filled or are still in the negotiating stage. On the other hand, the extent of the equipping the Turkish Armed Forces with materiel built by French technology does not justify the quantities of materiel taken on by the transports at Chateauroux and Rennes. What, then, did the Turkish transports take on and what was their destination?

## NATIONAL DEFENSE NEEDS INDIVIDUALITY, COHESION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Mar 87 p 7

/Article by Virgilio de Carvalho/

/Excerpt/ Portugal's most important defense task at this time of "ambiguous peace" is the preservation of its interterritorial cohesion and individuality in the competitive spheres of the EC and NATO (more than the identity which other nonindependent nations manage to maintain). This task implies that Portugal should continue to assert itself as a country of Western Europe; Western Europe in turn should recognize the valuable contribution of Portugal's enormous ZEE and its projection into the Atlantic, making it an essential component of the Atlantic defense system and not just a country of the South and Mediterranean--which it is not--simply aligned with other nations in debt for their subsidized development. It is important for Portugal to assume its nearly archipelagic Euro-Atlantic position which individualizes it on the peninsula, principally because its valued geostrategic, geoeconomic and historic-cultural potentialities might be coveted by certain countries, those which know what they want or do not want from the EC and NATO, always avid to fill gaps aimed at enlarging the scope of their economic, cultural, political and defensive status.

In essence, Portugal's preventive defense will be to take advantage of the multilateral nature of the EC for the country's development without imprudent bilateral arrangements with the all-embracing intervention of Spain, avoid having Spain become its principal trade partner and not help Madrid become the "capital of the peninsula" taking on the role of distribution point for all EC land transactions conducted on the peninsula and becoming the center of Iberian-Americanism encompassing all Portuguese-speaking territory itself; and to have the capability of military defense so that, while exercising sovereignty over its valuable geostrategic position since the time of peace within the NATO domain, it can avoid having any gap filled by allies which could lead to Portugal's "operational partitioning" by Spain and the United States on behalf of collective Atlantic security. Not protecting this and other aspects of its individuality, Portugal would have no other role to play in terms of prestige and influence in the EC, NATO, Portuguese-speaking areas and the world in general which respects and admires it for the postgamic era to which Toynbee alludes and to which Europe itself owed the beginning of its profitable entry into the affairs of the outside world.

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## ANONYMOUS PAMPHLET ON PAY CIRCULATES AMONG MILITARY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 28 Feb 87 p 3

[Text] For the past several days, an anonymous pamphlet has been circulating in several barracks of the three branches of the Armed Forces, specifically the Air Force and the Navy, in protest against the alleged "socioeconomic demotion" of the military. Distribution of the document, which so far seems to have reached few Army units, coincides with the effective date of the 11.5-percent pay increase granted to officers, NCO's, and enlisted men.

According to a high military authority contacted by EXPRESSO, there is nothing to indicate that the anonymous pamphlet--which he says was "issued solely for the purpose of causing trouble"--is not the responsibility of someone, individually or collectively, now in retirement or in the reserve. For that matter, the document itself refers explicitly only to military men in that situation--those who, as it says, "are being forgotten and condemned to the position of social outcasts that they occupied before 25 April 1974."

The document also says that the 11.5-percent increase (the same increase as that granted to the civil service) constitutes a "raise to offset inflation and not an increase in pay, as some of the state-owned media have tendentiously tried to make people believe."

The authors of the document then criticize a number of sectors whose workers have privileges unavailable to other socioprofessional classes. After mentioning a few specific examples, the document emphasizes that "what is most disturbing about all this is that it is the government itself which is protecting, supporting, and encouraging that which the Communist Party has been unable to achieve in more than a decade of strenuous efforts and which it is now preparing to receive on a salver: the pro-union movement of the Armed Forces."

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## BRIEFS

SELF-SUFFICIENT AZORES, MADEIRA DEFENSE--Portugal notified NATO military authorities a few months ago that it was in a position to assume sole responsibility for the ground defense of the Azores and Madeira. Our country was thereby waiving cooperation from its European allies, who until then had been entrusted with local defense of those archipelagoes in crisis situations. Lisbon's decision, which is linked to NATO military planning, reflects a desire to strengthen the ties of defense between the mainland and the autonomous regions and forestall any possible desire by other countries to occupy the islands in times of tension or confrontation. The draft military programming law, which was submitted to a plenary vote by the Assembly of the Republic yesterday, is also based on the desire to provide the Azores and Madeira with their own means of defense and, consequently, to give content to the strategic Portuguese triangle. As part of the same bill, the Assembly of the Republic authorized procurement of Hawk missiles to improve the defense capability of the Azores. Over the past 50 years, the archipelago has been involved in every European crisis and, to a large extent, those in the Middle East as well. [Excerpt] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Feb 87 p 5] 11798

CSO: 3542/59

## MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES OF ALPINE MILITIA DIVISION DESCRIBED

Frauenfeld ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITUNG in German Mar 87 pp 137-141

[Article by public information staff, 12th Mountain Division: "The 12th Mountain Division"]

[Text] The 12th Mountain Division, together with the combat brigades in its area of operations, represents the eastern pillar of the III Mountain Corps. Its combat mission is the prolonged defense of key areas and important lines of communication and protection of the infrastructure.

## Mission

As a unit of III Mtn Corps, the 12 Mtn Div has the basic combat mission of preventing enemy attacks within or through its territory starting at the national boundary; to intercept enemy attacks in critically important areas; to destroy enemy forces who have penetrated; to hold these areas for an extended period of time; to provide long-term protection for important installations of the civilian and military infrastructure; and, if applicable, to protect the rear and flanks of a field army corps.

The Swiss Alps are not likely to be an opponent's primary operational target. However, in a conflict between major powers the alpine regions may figure in enemy operational plans as alternate routes for their air forces or to protect a direct north-south land route (the Saint Bernard axis, for instance, which is also passable in wintertime) while advancing toward the west.

The reinforced 12th Mtn Div must therefore be able to handle threats from the south, east and north. Implicit in a mountain division's mission is the responsibility for augmenting the military capabilities of combat brigades in its territory. Consequently, the commander of a Mtn Div--because of the large size and dispersed nature of the operational area--exercises strategic command. He would rarely be able to effect combat operations directly.

## Area of Operation

The east-west axis of the operational area of the reinforced 12th Mtn Div is roughly 120 km long while the north-south axis coincides approximately with

the area of the Grisons Canton. These axial routes lead from numerous border points over mountain-pass roads--with limited wintertime access, however--to the vital center of the canton and, consequently, of the area of operations. All routes, with the exception of the Engadine axis, merge into the Saint Bernard axis.

The interior of Grisons, and particularly the Saint Bernard axis, has great operational significance. The latter simultaneously provides access, along Wallenstadt Lake, to the Linth plain and, via the upper Rhine valley, to the center of the Swiss Alps. The lateral Schyn-inland canal-Davos axis forms an "inner circle" and is very important in the operational area of the 12th Mtn Div.

The area of operations is characterized by highly structured and compartmentalized terrain with numerous narrows and steep slopes. One fourth of the terrain is forested, primarily with conifers; almost one half lacks ground cover or is above the timberline. Built-up areas and new construction, particularly in tourist areas, further compartmentalize the terrain and create bottlenecks--key points, which an enemy must penetrate to advance along the valley routes. They offer combat protection against the bulk of hostile fire.

Fighting a war in alpine areas means living and fighting at altitudes between 600 and 2500 m. Climatic and meteorologic conditions change rapidly and may completely alter the availability of roads and air space within hours.

Demolition tactics must be mentioned in connection with the environment. The destruction of objects in the area of the 12th Mtn Div which are permanently prepared for demolition, would create a gap totalling more than 3,500 m, which in theory corresponds to a delay factor of 250 days. The implementation of demolition would immediately present an enemy with radically changed environmental conditions.

#### Enemy Operations

We must reckon with a highly mechanized opponent who will almost certainly employ chemical agents. We know that this enemy disposes over conventional and electro-optical reconnaissance and intelligence resources which detect almost anything that is not appropriately camouflaged. Such reconnaissance and intelligence resources provide the capability for real-time responses such as immediate artillery and air strikes.

The situation in the mountain regions will hardly differ from that in the central region. We will have to reckon with the threat of massive, long-range, targeted strikes of great intensity.

Most axial routes leading through the mountains are very serviceable and quite capable of supporting a mechanized thrust through valleys and over mountain passes. Well-constructed forest and alpine service roads, moreover, allow outflanking maneuvers and the occupation of vital commanding peaks alongside the valleys up to the timberline.

Consequently, any modern enemy will not confine his attacks to valleys but will also execute mechanized or infantry thrusts over the most important, negotiable secondary peaks.

Since the increased use of helicopters also allows exploitation of the third dimension, the alpine regions have lost their previous characteristic of invincibility. Units can be transported quickly and unexpectedly by helicopter or other aircraft to regions from which surprise flanking maneuvers could be initiated much more rapidly and effectively. Attack helicopter strikes against individual targets, artillery emplacements and fortifications can be executed even more readily in mountainous terrain since extensive natural cover shields tactical flights. The employment of attack and transport helicopters must be expected in alpine warfare and presents a serious threat.

Preparations for hostile airborne operations in mountainous terrain will usually escape detection by the defenders. Transport helicopters can avail themselves of air routes over expansive mountain regions where our air defenses are weak or nonexistent. Air landings will, therefore, generally come as a surprise. The mission of an enemy's airborne operation will always be to maintain his offensive momentum. Likely objectives are commanding heights, passes and road junctions. The airborne enemy will tie up reserves and have a lasting impact on mobility.

#### Our Operations

The mountain division is an infantry-heavy unit. We lack highly mobile, strategic reserves, which can be quickly deployed and redeployed to focal combat points, and long-range fire support resources. We do not, therefore, have the forces and resources required to defeat an enemy, who will always enjoy quantitative superiority, in decisive battles of annihilation.

The absence of appreciable mobile, rapidly deployable, division-level reserves is largely compensated by forming task forces which are equipped to wage combined-arms combat. Such combat groups are capable of holding their own at critical points by timely concentration of forces and resources at specific locations.

Local successes are gained by a string of skirmishes and by holding onto critical terrain throughout the area of operations; local successes which, when taken together, will deny the enemy a chance to execute a successful blitzkrieg and prevent him from waging decisive battles when and where he can use his resources to best advantage.

The most significant characteristics of alpine warfare which can be used to our advantage are: the use of numerous, easily reinforceable terrain obstacles; the proper handling of demolitions as a decisive weapon; and the corresponding, made-to-measure, deeply staggered deployment of forces at obstacle and demolition points. The mountainous terrain in the area of the 12th Mtn Div favors the economical use of our forces and enables us to quickly ascertain the direction of an attack and the location of hostile units and their supply routes. Enemy forces are canalized and bound to axial routes of communication. Force deployment and force concentrations are made difficult



or impossible, a fact which prevents optimum utilization of high technology and mechanized resources. Narrow compartmentalization of the terrain reduces distances in the combat area and handicaps the mechanized enemy's combat operations, thus diminishing its effectiveness.

About one quarter of the 12th Mtn Div terrain is covered by forests. Pine forests not only offer cover against conventional ground and air reconnaissance but also offer good protection against the most recent developments in electro-optical reconnaissance.

In the forest it is not artillery fire and tanks but the infantryman who determines the outcome of the battle. Numerical superiority takes a back seat to thorough familiarity with the terrain and personal courage in close-range combat. If our infantry prepares for combat carefully and uses correct techniques in broken terrain, if it fights aggressively and maintains control of the operational area under all weather conditions and even at night, it will also be superior to a modern, mechanized opponent.

The deeper that enemy forces penetrate into our area of operations, the more numerous will be their weaknesses such as extended, unprotected flanks; vulnerable supply routes and artillery positions; and exposed command and logistic installations. This creates real possibilities for our strategy to succeed and to hold our own by sensing opportunities and taking advantage of them on the tactical and small unit level and by executing decisive, even annihilating blows in the course of harassment operations.

Airborne operations, which could surprise us at any point of the operational area, pose a serious threat to us. Air landing points or their commanding terrain are identified ahead of time and will be mined when defense plans are implemented; at that time, as a precautionary measure, they will also be protected by deploying our own forces in such a way that an enemy could be engaged with fire and maneuver at the critical time during and immediately after a landing. While our forces are inadequate to control all potential landing areas directly, the combat brigades and combat teams have artillery at their disposal--attached artillery and their own fixed and mobile, heavy mortars--to respond initially by directing fire at landing points. Subsequent combat against an airborne enemy will take the form of initiating and executing planned counterstrikes or counterattacks. We are not helpless in the face of hostile airborne operations.

All types of air defense weapons will play a decisive role against attack or transport helicopters. However, currently available resources restrict defense against air landings to the tactical arena. Strategic responses are precluded because there are no air transport resources for the timely deployment of reserves.

#### Training Emphasis--Prospects

Mountain forces, being "soft" units, must be trained to avoid detection by enemy reconnaissance and to survive bombardments. The infantry, moreover, must be able to move, day or night, over the rugged, forested and often rocky

valley slopes at any time of the year. This is accomplished by camouflage, dispersal, reverse slope positions, entrenchment, and field fortifications.

Training, therefore, emphasizes camouflage, mountain combat and harassment operations. Alpine training is never an end in itself; alpine techniques are only a prerequisite for mountain combat training.

Alpine training in the 12 Mtn Div is not the exclusive domain of a few specialists. Broad-based alpine training--whether for maneuvers along valley slopes, for occupying elevated pass positions or for carrying out attacks from mountain sides--is of paramount importance.

The mountain division can successfully confront a mechanized enemy with modern equipment by apt utilization of the difficult terrain. The greatest danger to mountain forces is posed by attack helicopters and, to a lesser degree, artillery. It would be desirable to increase mobility by providing adequate air transport resources.

The air defense units of the mountain divisions are too weak for the size of their operational area. Especially wanting is an effective weapon against attack helicopters that is not tied to roads. The artillery needs to be renovated, particularly with regard to self-defense and the range and caliber of its guns.

The mountain division is a component of our defense army. It fights in familiar terrain. Our inferiority in weapons and equipment can be balanced to a considerable degree by exploiting the environment as much as possible. The nature of the mission, combat tactics, terrain and the effectiveness of enemy weapons make it mandatory to fight with small units and unit components and to take advantage of the broken terrain, bad weather and the night. Familiarity with the terrain and a strong logistic infrastructure are our strong points.

Persistence in training, specifically tailored to a modern enemy and our strong points, as well as insistence on discipline on the battlefield, create the prerequisites for success in battle.

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CSO: 3620/171

## LAW LIMITS PAYMENT IN LIEU OF MILITARY SERVICE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 Jan 87 pp 1, 10

[Article by Betul Uncular: "Limit on Payment in Lieu of Military Service"]

[Text] Minister of National Defense Zeki Yavuzturk announced that the bill to amend the law pertaining to payment in lieu of military service was being completed and that it would soon be submitted to the Prime Ministry. Mr Yavuzturk said that the bill provides for those who wish to do so to apply for payment in lieu of military service; however, if the applications exceed the limit set by the General Staff then the selection will be based on a lottery system. Mr Yavuzturk added that candidates for reserve officers will not be eligible for payment in lieu of military service.

In answering the questions of CUMHURIYET on this subject, Minister of National Defense Yavuzturk explained the functioning of the lottery system in the proposed bill for payment in lieu of military service as follows:

"The number in each call-up who want to pay in lieu of military service after completion of their basic military training will be determined by the Chief of Staff. This number will be based on the excess supply of conscripts over the military requirement and the demand for servicemen from the state establishments and organizations.

"The determination of who will be eligible to pay in lieu of military service will be based on applications.

"If the number of applicants exceeds the limit set by the General Staff, the eligible candidates will be determined by a lottery of all those who applied to pay in lieu of military service.

"If the number of applicants is less than or equal to the number set by the Chief of the General Staff, the selection will not require a lottery and all applicants will be eligible for payment in lieu of military service."

In answering a question, Minister of Defense Yavuzturk said that there were 2,204 conscripts called up during March and June 1986 who were transferred to state establishments and organizations where they were currently serving their military duties. He added that 146 conscripts had paid in lieu of military service and had been discharged after serving their basic training.

Mr Yavuzturk announced that reserve officer candidates who are subject to Law No 1076 will not be eligible for payment in lieu of military service and added:

"The practice of payment in lieu of military service includes privates and non-commissioned officers who are subject to Law No 1111 and who are required to serve 18 months. Those who are required to serve for 8 months will not be eligible as they are part of the reserve officer candidates subject to Law No 1076."

12874/12859

CSO: 3554/158

## SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH REFLECTED IN ENERGY PRODUCTION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Jan 87 p 29

[Unsigned article: "Electricity Consumption Grew by Half a Percent in 1986"]

[Text] Last year Finland used 52.7 kilowatt billion hours of electricity. The growth over 1985 was a little over 0.6 billion kilowatt hours or a whole percent, as indicated in statistics gathered by the Suomen Sähkölaitosyhdistys [Finnish Electric Power Plant Association]. The revised energy taxation system increased the tax burden on electricity, and consumer prices for electricity rose 11 percent on the average during the year.

No less than one-third of the country's electricity requirements were generated by nuclear power. Hydroelectric power fell for the second year in a row to only a bare fourth of electricity use. The output of cogeneration by communities and industry surpassed the output of hydroelectric power for the first time.

The use of electricity last year grew noticeably slower than in the 3 previous years, and during the 1980's growth has been slower only in 1982.

According to the electric power association the slow growth in the use of electricity resulted from the slowdown in the growth of industrial output and from the fact that long-lasting and severe cold spells had raised electricity consumption in 1985 considerably.

Last year's slow growth, however, was equivalent to 8 months output at Imatra, the country's largest hydroelectric plant. In the 3 previous years the use of electricity grew in each one by an amount equal to the annual output of Loviisa's one nuclear power plant.

## One-Third of the Electricity From Nuclear Power Plants

Finland's economic growth was at a standstill at the beginning of the year, and the strengthening of growth in the latter half of the year still did not manage to speed up the use of electricity. Industry uses nearly 60 percent of the country's electricity and the forest products industry alone nearly 40 percent.

Over a third of last year's electricity consumption was covered by nuclear power and just under a fourth by cogeneration and hydropower. Other thermal power covered 8 percent of consumption. Net imports of electricity accounted for 11 percent. Electricity from the Soviet Union rose to nearly 4.7 billion kilowatt hours, which was an increase of nearly 11 percent compared to the previous year.

Nuclear power plants produced 18 billion kilowatt hours of electricity last year or the same amount as in 1985. The utilization factors of all four of the nuclear power plants has been continually among the best in the world in recent years.

#### More Cogeneration Electricity From the Cities

The cities and industry produce both electricity and heat in cogeneration plants; output has increased especially in the cities. Last year over 12 billion kilowatt hours of cogeneration electricity were generated, nearly 3 percent more than in the cold year 1985. New cogeneration plants have been built in Jyvaskyla and Joensuu. In industry the output of cogeneration electricity declined by a half percent.

In the generation of hydroelectric power it was the second mediocre year in a row. The exceptionally good water years from 1981 to 1984 appear to be a thing of the past. The rains at the end of the year, however, improved the water situation. Twelve billion kilowatt hours of electricity were obtained from hydroelectric power, and the output of hydroelectric power grew about half a percent over the previous year.

Net imports of electricity grew strongly last year. In addition to the amount specified in the agreement with the Soviet Union, electricity that had failed to be delivered in the early 1980's because of delivery difficulties was imported belatedly from the Soviet Union.

Imports from Sweden also grew. The export of electricity to Sweden decreased by about a half from 1985. The exchange of electricity with Sweden is a part of the Nordel cooperation among the Nordic countries.

The price of electricity has remained stable in recent years. At the beginning of August the revised energy taxation system came into effect, and the shift to a 16 percent turnover tax raised the price of household and agricultural electricity about 11 percent on the average. Small consumers at present pay 37.1 pennies per kilowatt hour for electricity on the average.

Compared to the rise in the cost of living electricity now costs only a little over half its level two decades ago. The decline in the real cost of electricity is expected to continue. The price of electricity will remain the same this year.

The year 1986 was milder than the previous year, which is manifested in the use of electricity too. December, however, was colder than normal.

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END